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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between utilities and renewable energy' is important
because utilities will determine to a large extent the development of renewable energy in the United States. To understand this key role that utilities
will play, it is necessary to explain how utilities are regulated. The purpose
of this article is to provide both an overview of the ways in which renewable
energy applications affect utilities, and an analysis of relevant legal principles that shape this relationship.
The article is divided into three major sections. The first section introduces the general nature of utility involvement in renewable energy use.
It discusses thet various types of utilities most likely to take an interest in
renewable energy, the kinds of applications that are the subject of this interest, and the conditions that generally will trigger this utility interest. The
second section focuses on the legal relationship between utilities and decentralized renewable energy applications-technologies which operate at the
site of the customer and reduce the need for the utility to provide power to
the customer. Because such decentralized technologies are presently marketable, their use will have important legal and economic consequences for utilities. The final section outlines the important legal issues that arise from
1. "Renewable" energy forms are, as the term implies, capable of supplying energy by
resources that are largely inexhaustible. Such resources, and their applications, are:

Resource

Application

(1)

hot water (active systems)
space heating and cooling (active)
passive systems (heating and cooling)

the sun (solar)

industrial process heat
solar thermal power (electricity)

photovoltaics (electricity)
(2)

the wind

wind energy conversion systems (electricity)

(3)

biomass

gas
alcohol fuels
residue waste heat (electricity)

(4)

rivers

low head hydroelectric power (electricity)

ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) (electricity)
waves and tidal power (electricity)
Several studies predict that these renewable energy forms could supply up to 20% of the
(5)

the ocean

country's energy needs. Set H. KENDALL & S. NADis, ENERGY STRATEGIEs: TOWARD A SOLAR
FUTURE (1980); R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE (1980); HousE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH INSTIrTUE, REPORT ON BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1981).
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utilities' adoption of centralized renewable energy applications-technologies that allow utilities to provide power from renewable fuels directly to
customers. Due to their high cost and technical complexity, centralized renewable energy applications are not as market-ready as decentralized applications. Therefore, the discussion of legal issues is relatively brief.
I.

OVERVIEW:

THE NATURE OF UTILITY INVOLVEMENT. IN RENEWABLE
ENERGY APPLICATIONS

A.

Types of Ut'lities and Their Dijfering Relationships to Renewable Energy

Utilities can be divided into several categories. The most obvious way
to classify utilities is by their end product. Utilities usually supply gas, electricity or both. Another way of classifying them is by their function. Some
electric utilities generate electricty; others purchase it wholesale from utilities
that generate electricity, and distribute or transmit it to their customers; still
others perform all of these functions. Gas utilities do not "generate" gas, but
merely purchase it from pipeline companies and distribute it to their
customers.
Utilities may also be classified by their ownership and regulation. Most
are privately owned and are regulated by state public utility commissions
(PUCs). Some are owned by the federal government and are generally operated by agencies of the Department of Energy or Interior under federal law.
Still others are owned by other public bodies, generally municipalities, and
regulated by municipal charter and state law. Finally, many are owned and
operated by rural nonprofit cooperatives that both generate and distribute
power to rural customers.
The final way of categorizing utilities is by the fuel used to produce
power. Gas utilities obviously use and sell natural and synthetic gas. Electric utilities, however, have a number of alternative sources of fuel. For
many years the cheapest fuels were gas and oil and, where available, conventional and pumped storage hydroelectric power. With rising oil and gas
costs, and a reduction of new hydroelectric capacity, electric utilities turned
to coal and uranium as fuels. 2 Many electric utilities now rely on a combination of fuels for differing needs. Nuclear plants are generally used to meet
the utilities' baseload requirements; coal-fired plants are used for intermediate needs; and power plants that rely on oil, gas, gas turbines, and diesels are
often used to meet the utilities' peaking requirements.
1. Electric Utilities and Renewable Energy
The electric power industry is comprised of a variety of utility systems,
2. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA), 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. III
1979), creates various restrictions upon the use of oil or gas by electric utilities and industrial
facilities. Strict rules limit the use of oil or gas in plants constructed after the passage of FUA.
In addition, existing powerplants must limit their use of natural gas to the quantity used during
the 1974-76 base period and, after January 1, 1990, must cease using gas entirely. These existing powerplants are free, under FUA, to switch from gas to oil. Thus, FUA, conceived in
1977 and enacted in 1978, has the immediate effect of encouraging electric utilities to reduce oil
and gas use, and increase coal consumption.
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some owned by private companies (investor-owned), some by the federal
government, municipalities, states, or public utility districts, and some by
electric cooperatives. In all there are nearly 4000 individual enterprises. As
volume of utility business is handled by
in other industries, much of the total
3
a small fraction of the enterprises.
There are approximately 400 investor-owned electric power utilities, less
than ten percent of the systems in the entire industry. In terms of any index
of size, however, such as kilowatts of generating capacity or number of customers, the investor-owned systems constitute the dominant segment of the
industry. Sizes of investor-owned systems range from the largest in the nation with annual sales in excess of ninety million megawatt hours, to some of
the very smallest. The 200 largest systems own and operate more than seventy-five percent of the generating capacity and serve4 about eighty percent
of the customers of the total electric power industry.
Because of sheer size alone, investor-owned electric utilities will play the
dominant role in utility interaction with renewable energy technologies.
The major responsibility for the regulation of investor-owned utility activities has traditionally rested with PUCs. The scope of the authority of state
utility commissions to regulate these systems varies considerably among the
states. Nevertheless, most state commissions have rather broad powers, including the regulation of rates and adequacy of service, as well as authority
for certification of major property additions and utility involvement in ownership, sale, leasing, or financing of various marketing activities. These regulatory powers (and the state commissions that exercise them) will be critical
electric utilities will play in
in determining the ultimate role investor-owned
5
the future of renewable energy development.
The other type of electric utility that may be active in the renewable
3. The data which follows regarding the structure and size of the electric utility industry
is drawn largely from the U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., Inventory of
Power Plants in the United States-Dec., 1979 (1980); and U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., National Power Surveys of the Federal Power Commission, conducted

in 1964, 1970, and 1974.
4. These large investor-owned systems are for the most part vertically integrated. The
majority are independently owned and operated, although many are subsidiaries of firms registered as holding companies under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Some are subsidiaries of companies which for various reasons are
exempt from the provisions of that Act. These subsidiaries are grouped into holding companies
controlled by a few firms, which also operate electric utilities, and some are owned by nonoperating holding companies. The subsidiaries of the nonoperating holding companies provide
roughly one-quarter of the generating capacity of the investor-owned segment.
Nearly all of the major investor-owned utilities operate integrated generation, transmission,
and distribution systems, and many are also engaged in distributing gas. In general, the electric
portion of these combination utilities has greater revenues and plant investment than the gas
portion. This is primarily due to the large investment in electrical production and transmission
facilities, compared to the smaller investment in distribution facilities for gas.
5. From the standpoint of renewable energy use, the crucial regulatory function is rate
approval. Typically, regulatory agencies first decide how much a utility will be allowed to earn,
and then approve rate schedules designed to produce that profit. The rate of return is a function of the rate base, those investments on which the utility may make a profit. Operating
expenses, including fuel costs, taxes, and other noncapital costs, are then added to determine the
total revenue needs. A decision to market or lease solar collectors would have to be approved by
the utility commission before these expenses could be added to the rate base. It should be noted
that the utility profits only if it makes an investment in capital. Therefore, a utility might
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energy field is that which is federally-owned. A few large federal agencies
market power in the forty-eight contiguous states: the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southwestern
Power Administration (SWPA), Southeastern Power Administration
(SEPA), Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), and Bureau of Reclamation. They are important contributors to the electric power supply of
this country and are second only to the investor-owned systems in terms of
generating capacity. Federally-owned utilities- also supply much electric
power to other electric systems (for example, municipally-owned and rural
cooperatives). 6 Moreover, with the exception of the TVA, all the major fed7
eral utilities are operated by Department of Energy agencies. This centralization of authority, combined with the extensive reach of federally-produced
electric power, suggests the far-reaching consequences of a decision to have
8
federally-owned utilities become actively involved in renewable energy. Indeed, it is likely that efforts to implement renewable energy programs on
federal utility systems will trigger more initiatives by privately-owned
9
utilities.
finance the purchase of solar collectors by homeowners, but the utility would lose the benefits of
depreciation and of the increase in its rate base.
6. The federal government's role in the electric utility field reflects a broad range of objectives. The TVA was authorized in 1933 to develop hydroelectric power resources in the Tennessee River Basin in conjunction with navigation and flood control. Following essentially full
utilization of the hydroelectric potential of the basin, the TVA developed a comprehensive
power production system by adding fossil-fuel and nuclear generating plants. It is now the
nation's largest power system, having approximately twice the generating capacity of the next
largest, and is the only federal agency with full responsibility to supply all the electric power
requirements of a large geographical area. The TVA sells over half of its production at wholesale to municipal and cooperative systems, with most of the balance going to industrial customers and federal agencies.
Large federal power agencies other than the TVA market hydroelectric power and generally supplement the supplies of other systems. The Department of Energy is the marketing
agent for power produced by all federal projects other than the TVA. Except for sales to a
number of large industrial customers, nearly all of the power is sold at wholesale to other electric systems.
7. This is not to say that federally-owned utilities are subject only to Department of Energy regulations. On the contrary, they are also controlled extensively by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which has responsibility for regulating wholesale rates of interstate sales of gas and electricity, for setting and housing hydroelectric plants, and for sales
between utilities and small power producers and cogenerators. Set 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(c), 817,
824-837h (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (Supp. IV 1980). The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates certain phases of
the subsidiaries of federally-owned utilities engaged in the electric utility business, including
accounting, security issuances, and inter-company transactions. Also, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has authority to regulate construction of all nuclear reactors owned and operated
by federally-owned utilities.
8. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH

INSTITUTE, REPORT ON BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE]; Bonneville Power Administration

Proposes Small Wind Machine 'lot Project, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 559 (1979); TV Moves FurtherAlong
Solar Path, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 714 (1979).
9. Two other types of electric utilities-non-federal, public electric systems and rural electric cooperatives-also have some potential for renewable energy development. Nonfederal
public electric systems generate approximately one-tenth of total industry production. These
systems, which include towns, cities, a small number of counties, special utility districts, and
various kinds of state authorities, purchase approximately 35% of their requirements from the
federal systems and an additional 11% from the investor-owned systems.
Municipal utilities are by far the most common form of the public, nonfederal power en-
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Gas Utilities and Renewable Energy

Natural gas, originally a nuisance by-product of oil, is today a critical
component of our nation's energy supply. Gas now supplies roughly 19.8
quadrillion Btu's (quads) of energy to the United States market, or forty
percent of the energy consumed in residential and commercial buildings,
fifteen percent of that consumed by electric utilities, and thirty-eight percent
of that consumed in the industrial sector. '0 There is enormous regional variation in the pattern of gas use. In the Southwest, gas is the primary fuel for
electric utility generation. In the Midwest, it dominates the residential heating and industrial energy markets. Gas plays a relatively minor, but gradually increasing, role in the Northeast.
Utilities supplying natural gas have a potential interest in renewable
energy for two reasons. First, one renewable energy fuel, biomass, serves as a
relatively reliable source of gas supply. Because existing natural gas sources
are not adequate to satisfy the enormous demand for service that would exist
if oil users were free to switch to gas, utilities may be interested in the development of new and renewable supplies of gas. II Second, decentralized, nongenerating renewable energy applications, such as solar hot water and space
conditioning systems, may assist in reducing the demand for natural gas.
Since utilities may, despite the potential of biomass and other expensive
sources (e.g., coal gasification), be faced with declining gas supplies, they
may be willing to investigate ways of reducing demand through decentralized solar use.
Despite this potential, several federal and state policies inhibit gas utility interest in the development of natural gas supplies through renewable
sources or in the reduction of demand for natural gas through decentralized
solar applications. The production and consumption of natural gas has been
declining slowly since the early 1970's. This production trend, however, is
likely to reverse itself due to the price incentives provided by the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978,12 which requires gradual deregulation of prices
through the 1980's. As prices rise, production companies should have more
short-term incentive to locate and develop existing sources of conventional
tity. They vary in size from very small systems, serving only a few hundred customers, to the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, which serves over a million customers. In a
relatively few instances (e.g., Cleveland, Ohio), a municipal and an investor-owned system serve
within the same municipality. Some municipal utilities are taking an active interest in renewable energy technologies. See California Cities Considenng MunicipalSolar Utilities, I SOLAR L. REP.
529 (1979); L.A. Ciy Utilid> Makes So/ar Loans, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 908 (1980); Voters Approve Munici
pal Utlyt So/ar Loans, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 914 (1980).
The Rural Electrification Administration, established as a lending agency in 1936, has
financed the construction of about a thousand rural electric service cooperatives in 46 states,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These utilities range in size from less than 100 members to
as many as 35,000. Although they have a membership representing 10% of all electric power
customers in the country, their total sales of energy are only about four and one-half percent of
the national total, and their generating capacity is about one percent. Even if these utilities
become involved in renewable energy promotion, their impact will be fairly small.
10. &e BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTRE, supra note 8, at 907.
11. It has been estimated that between 0.2 and 4.0 quads of gas could be produced from
biomass annually at prices ranging between $5.90 and 88.40/MBtu. BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE
FuTuRE, supra note 8, at 908.

12. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1980).
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natural gas, and less incentive to develop new and relatively more expensive
sources of biomass.
On the demand side, solar systems will be able to compete with natural
gas only if the cost of solar systems is below projected gas prices. Despite
phased deregulation of natural gas, and despite tax incentives for solar space
heating and hot water, solar system costs appear to be well above the forecasted costs of natural gas. One study commissioned by the American Gas
Association yielded the following pessimistic findings:
Solar heating systems in the residential gas market will have minimal impact on gas utilities through 1990. Conventional gas space
heating and hot water systems remain more economical than comparable solar systems through the year 1990, based on current estimates of gas prices derived from the American Gas Association.
Projected U.S. annual energy savings from solar-gas space heating
and/or hot water systems in the residential gas market indicate
that with no utility involvement solar energy savings in 1990 are
less than 0.5 percent. Even with utilities providing lease arrangerepresent only 2 percent of the residential gas
ments, solar savings
t3
demand for 1990.
Interest in renewable energy development is minimized further by federal and state policies that allow gas utilities to charge customers rates that
reflect only the average cost of the gas. Average cost pricing rolls in expensive, new, deregulated sources of gas with less expensive regulated gas, and
results in an average price that is still below the cost of the new sources. One
result is that customers are not confronted with, and do not have to pay, the
actual cost of providing the gas. Consequently, alternatives to natural gas,
such as renewable energy forms, are not able to compete. Only when gas
prices are set according to their marginal cost-the price that reflects, to the
maximum extent practicable, the actual cost of supplying the gas-will renewable energy appear to be a more attractive investment option to gas utilities and their customers.
Because the prospects for gas utility involvement in renewable energy
appear uncertain, most of the following analysis concentrates on electric utilities. Electric utilities may be interested in renewable energy development
because, unlike gas utilities, they are generally required to provide electricity
to any customer in their service area. This requirement ensures that electric
utilities will find renewable energy useful either as a supplemental source of
fuel for generating capacity or as a means of regulating and reducing demand on existing capacity. Also, because electricity is more widely used
than gas, it is a more likely source of back-up power for decentralized renewable energy applications, thereby precipitating electric utility interest in the
effect such back-up requirements will have on the utility system.1 4 Finally,
13.

D. BOYD, J. CASKEY, G. PRICE, & P. SPEWAK, SOLAR IMPACTS ON GAS UTILITIES, XI-

xii (1976).
14. One countervailing trend argues ihfawr of future gas utility interest in renewable en-

ergy. In recent years, supplies of gas have not kept pace with projected demand. The opportunities available for increasing fuel supplies, primarily imported liquefied natural gas and
gasified coal, involve high costs and technical and environmental uncertainty. Thus, for some
uses, current solar heating technology may be on the brink of economic viability. Because re-
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as noted above, of all the different types of electric utilities, the size and
market penetration of the investor-owned, PUC-regulated sector makes it
the most likely candidate to take the lead in renewable energy development.
Unless otherwise noted, this type of electric utility is the focus of the remainder of this article.
B.

Prospectsfor Utility Interest n Renewable Energy

Although it appears that investor-owned electric utilities will be most
likely to become involved in renewable energy, their involvement is by no
means assured. Renewable energy must be cost competitive with conventional investment options before any type of utility will participate in its
applications. For example, utilities will not be much interested in decentralized renewable energy applications to reduce demand on their load if such
applications are unable to compete economically with traditional demand
reduction techniques, such as conservation and load management. Before
utilities seriously consider using renewable energy fuels and their related
generating technologies, such investment options must appear economical
when compared with conventional approaches.
Although it may be economical for some utilities to invest in or take
advantage of renewable energy technologies, institutional and regulatory
barriers may intervene. For example, even if an active solar space heating
unit can reduce the demand on an overloaded electric utility more cheaply
than either new capacity or traditional home conservation measures, the
utility may still be uninterested in the solar system if the solar unit functions
best only during off-peak hours and therefore does not reduce the utility's
peak load requirements. Even if the solar unit is both cheaper than conservation and able to shave the utility's peak, PUC regulations may forbid
the utility from commercializing or even encouraging customer use of the
solar system. 15 Similarly, if a utility with insufficient capacity decides that
an investment in a large, electricity-producing wind machine is less expensive than conventional nuclear or coal-fired power plants, it may nevertheless reject the option if the reliability of either the wind resource or the
equipment itself is uncertain. Even given that the wind machine is both
cheaper than conventional capacity and reliable, the utility may lose interest
if it decides that it will be too difficult to comply with local siting
regulations. 16
Economic, institutional, and legal issues will thus shape the nature and
extent of utility involvement in renewable energy. What follows is an analysis of these issues, divided according to whether the potential utility involvement is in decentralized or centralized renewable energy applications. This
newable energy may be used as a substitute for natural gas, certain gas utilities have begun to
show considerable interest in exploiting the market. In some states, gas companies have requested permission to market solar energy devices as part of a combined gas/solar energy
package.
?, 56 DEN. L. J. 31,
15. See, e.g., Laitos & Feuerstein, May Regulated Utih'esMAonopolie t/e
43-47 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Noun, Lotker, & Friesema, Utility Siting of WECS: A Preliminary Legal/Regulatory Assessment, SERI Rep. TR-744-778 (May 1981).
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bifurcated organization is compelled by the fact that the legal questions facing utilities will vary according to whether the renewable energy applications are on the customer's premises (decentralized) or controlled by the
utility (centralized). Also, decentralized renewable applications produce different economic and institutional consequences for utilities than centralized
applications; the former reduce the utility's need to supply power but the
latter allow the utility to supply power. Although the focus of the discussion
is legal and regulatory, a significant amount of analysis is devoted to economic and institutional issues. This non-legal analysis is necessary because
any legal and regulatory questions which emerge are largely the result of the
economic and institutional conditions confronting utilities interested in renewable energy applications.

II.

UTILITIES AND DECENTRALIZED RENEWABLE ENERGY APPLICATIONS

There are two kinds of decentralized renewable applications which will
have the most immediate effect on utilities in the 1980's. The first, which
may be labeled "nonelectric solar technologies," reduces the user's need for
conventionally-supplied hot water, space heating, and space cooling. Examples are active solar hot water systems, active space heating and cooling systems, and passive systems.
The second of these renewable technologies produces electricity for the
user. Renewable technologies having this effect are small wind energy conversion systems, photovoltaic applications, low head hydroelectric facilities,
and small scale plants which burn biomass to turn a generator. These electricity-producing technologies, like the nonelectric technologies, decrease the
demand on the utility's load. 17 Unlike nonelectric technologies, however,
17. Because the primary effect of both electric and nonelectric decentralized renewable
applications is to reduce demand, utilities will be interested in promoting them if two conditions
are present: 1) if demand reduction improves profits; and 2) if the innovations can successfully
compete with such traditional methods of reducing demand as conservation and load management techniques.
Several factors influence whether electric utilities will demonstrate much interest in decentralized renewable applications. Utilities with low reserve margins should be interested because
customer use of renewable energy will help such utilities should an electric generating unit fail.
Utilities with low load factors should be attracted because these technologies improve the utilities' annual load factor by coupling the renewable application with a load management system.
Still others with high load growth rates should be interested because customer use of such energy might be more economical than the installation of new generating capacity. Because of the
high cost and uncertain availability of imported oil, utilities burning it would be interested in
the ability of renewable energy sources to reduce this consumption. Similarly, because environ-

mental and safety concerns have delayed bringing nuclear capacity on line, utilities that have
planned for nuclear capacity should be considered good prospects for decentralized renewable
energy development. Finally, utilities will be more interested in renewable energy applications
where high electricity costs create an incentive for the consumer to find alternative ways to meet
energy needs. See Utilties Put the Sun to Work, ELErRIC POWER RESEARcH INST. J., at 26 Mar.
1978; J. Laitos, W. Brown, & R. Taylor, Proceedings: SERI-ERA Workshop on Electric Utility
Involvement in Residential Solar Applications, SERI Rep. CP-733-781 Oct. 1981.
Even with these factors, a utility may be uninterested in decentralized renewable applications if its management believes that conservation and load management techniques can reduce
costs more cheaply and effectively. Of particular interest are load management technologies
that allow utilities to install more baseload capacity (which is most economically operated at
high capacity factors) and thereby reduce the consumption of oil and gas needed for peaking
units. Utility system storage could achieve this benefit by enabling generators to charge for
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these applications often have the potential of generating more electricity
than the user can absorb. In such circumstances, the user will want to sell
this excess power to the utility, which the utility may or may not want to
buy.
A.

Utihties and Nonelectric, Decentralized,Renewable Technologies

Potential users of nonelectric renewable technologies are both varied
and numerous. Single family residences are currently the most common,
with a growing trend among multi-user residential systems, including apartment buildings, condominiums, and mobile home parks, as well as commercial establishments, such as shopping centers, industrial parks, schools, and
office buildings. Even the agricultural and industrial sectors have begun to
use solar assisted process heat to carry out certain manufacturing and agri18
cultural processes.
Expanded use of nonelectric renewable applications by these end-users
may produce different responses by utilities and their regulators. Utilities
unhappy with the technical and economic effects of solar on the utility system might prefer to refuse to provide back-up power to solar users. PUCs
may allow utilities to charge discriminatory rates to users for back-up power;
or, instead of resisting renewable applications, utilities may seek to sell, lease,
or finance renewable energy systems.
1.

The Effect of Nonelectric Renewable Technologies on Utilities

The effect of solar technologies on an electric utility's load profile,
which is the systemwide electric demand placed on the utility each hour, is
the primary utility concern. Some type of conventional auxiliary system is
needed to provide back-up energy when the solar system is not providing the
necessary energy, either because of a malfunction, cloudy weather, or the
demand outstripping the supply from the solar unit. If the backup energy
used is electricity, the utility must maintain reserve capacity. However,
when the solar unit is operative, this capacity will often remain idle. The
load factor (the ratio of the average electric use during a period of time to
the maximum amount demanded by a particular use during the same period) is thus low when this occurs. The lower the load factor is, the fewer the
storage during off peak hours and dispatch stored energy during peak consumption hours. Load
management technologies and conservation techniques would operate on the demand side by
load leveling, or by decreasing consumption during peak hours and increasing consumption
during off-peak hours. See Taylor, Rates, Conservation, and Alternative Energy Sources, paper
delivered to Planning, Conservation, and Regulation: Issues for the 80's Workshop, Laramie,
Wyoming (Nov. 1979).
If the adoption of decentralized renewable energy sources appears disadvantageous to a
utility, the utility might not be adverse to renewable energy development providing it was absle
to recover costs through an appropriate rate structure. Renewable energy may also be of interest to a utility if: 1) it perceives certain noncost institutional benefits that reduce demand,
including, for example, when such involvement helps to ensure the growth of the utility; 2) decentralized renewable applications affect its demand forecasting abilities; or 3) regulating agencies or laws require some level of utility participation in renewable energy. See, e.g., Title II of
the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8211-8226 (Supp. 111 1979).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SOLAR ENERGY FOR AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROCESS HEAT, PROGRAM SUMMARY (1978).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:4

total units of energy over which the capital cost for the capacity can be
spread, and the higher the rates. A utility's peaking capacity, though rarely
used, must be kept in reserve and paid for through the rates charged over the
entire year. 19
Since the extra peaking equipment has fixed capital costs which must
be paid for during the extended periods of no solar customer demand, the
unit cost for serving the solar customer's occasional demand will be higher
than that for the nonsolar customer, who has a higher but steadier demand.
Therefore, some utilities argue that solar customers should pay higher rates
for infrequently used back-up electrical service to compensate for revenue
losses resulting from the necessity of maintaining peak capacity. Without
the higher rates, nonsolar users arguably subsidize solar users.
These potential problems can be exacerbated by two factors: the extent
of penetration of renewable energy technologies in a utility's service area and
the timing of back-up demand by users of these technologies. The scenario
envisioned by some commentators is that with widespread penetration in a
utility's service area and a period of inclement weather during a peak period,
users of renewable energy devices must rely on back-up energy, thereby
worsening the utility's peaking problems. The results are similar for winter
peaking natural gas utilities which must meet peak demands with expensive
20
liquefied natural gas, or other costly substitutes.
All these potential adverse consequences depend on a number of factors.
For example, one must determine whether customers using renewable energy
devices will require auxiliary energy during peak utility hours. Several variables influence the timing and duration of the need for auxiliary energy.
Some examples are the amount of solar system storage, weather conditions
during previous days, the size of the solar collector, and conservation measures undertaken by the user. Differences also exist between utility characteristics which may also influence the impact of renewable energy systems on
a utility's load profile. These characteristics include customer mix, generation mix, the type of fuel used in the service area, and the timing and extent
19. Utility spokespersons most frequently cite as the primary difficulty, and as their dominant concern, the potential disruption of the utility's load factors. Load factors, the percentage
of total capacity in operation at any given time, are crucial because they are directly related
both to the rates charged to customers and to profits. While the ideal demand curve would be
flat, the normal energy demand curve is a series of peaks and valleys in both diurnal and annual
cycles. The utility must maintain sufficient capacity to meet the peaks, even though the upper
15% of the annual demand occurs only about 10% of the time, and the yearly maximum may
last only a few hours.
Decentralized renewable energy usage could potentially disrupt load factors unless properly integrated into the utility system. An extended period of low insolation might increase the
peak load demand as the solar energy system's storage capacity is exhausted. However, during
periods of high insolation the solar energy system would require little auxiliary energy. As a
result, the utility would have lower valleys without a corresponding reduction in peak demand.
See Lawrence & Minan, The Competith.e Aspects of Utility Participation n Solar Development, 54 IND.
L.J. 229 (1979).
20. For a discussion of the impacts of solar systems on electric utilities, see OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT,

APPLICATION

OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY'S ENERGY

NEEDS 151-59 (1978); J. Laitos & R. Feuerstein, Regulated Utilities and Solar Energy, SERI
Report No. TR-62-255, at 62-65 (June 1979).
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2
of system peak demands.

1

The nature of a renewable energy application will also affect its impact
on a utility. Solar water heaters can be expected to impact favorably on
operations during the summer peak, which occurs during hot afternoons
when the air conditioning load is high. A utility's peak is determined by the
temperature, which is related to insolation, and it can be expected to occur
on one of the hottest days of the year or after a period of several consecutive
hot days.
Solar space heating should not cause difficulties for utilities when the
highest winter peak is considerably less than the summer peak. Adequate
capacity to meet the auxiliary energy needs of buildings equipped with solar
space heating should be available. The available reserve for a utility may
not, however, be dramatically larger in the winter than in the summer.
Although solar space cooling systems are not yet as developed as solar
heating and hot water systems, they should have a significant effect on summer-peaking utilities in the future because air conditioning loads are primarily responsible for summer peaks. An efficient solar cooling system can
reduce consumption of electricity during peak periods and thereby reduce
the utility's maintained capacity, which will offset reductions in revenue resulting from fewer sales of electricity. Improperly designed systems, however, could serve only to create greater utility problems.
The incorporation of passive design into a structure will reduce radiant
heat gain through windows in the summer and maximize that gain in the
winter. Consequently, a passive home can maintain a more consistent indoor temperature with reduced reliance on mechanical heating and cooling
systems. Passive homes are thus likely to have peak shaving capabilities for
22
utilities.
The use of peak energy by owners of renewable energy technologies
can
be minimized by encouraging daily diversity of consumption. Such diversity
can be accomplished by applying electric heating storage technology to certain solar applications. Proper utilization of thermal storage takes advantage of the fact that the period of collection and the time of demand are not
necessarily coincident. Since the technology of thermal storage for active
solar systems is well developed and relatively inexpensive, and since storage
of electricity is prohibitively costly, storage of heated or chilled water is an
extremely attractive load management alternative. Passive design also
utilizes dense building materials to store heat for long periods. With proper
thermal storage, a solar system may operate through peak periods without
resorting to auxiliary power, though optimal sizing of storage capacity for
21. Feldman & Anderson, FnancialIncentivesfor the Adoption of Solar Energy Design." Peak Load
riing of Back-up Systems, 17 SOLAR ENERGY 339 (1976).
22. Reliable data measuring the impact of nonelectric solar technologies on utilities is
sparse. Among the better published studies are: S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRicING AND SOLAR ENERGY DESIGN (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as UTILITY PRICING]; H.
LORSCH, IMPLICATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL SOLAR SPACE CONDITIONING ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES (Franklin Inst. publishers 1977); AEROSPACE CORP. SHACOB: REQUIREMENTS, DEFINITION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT (Electric Power Research Inst. publisher 1978);

Dickson, Eichen, & Feldman, Solar Energy and US Pub/ic Utilities, ENERGY

POL'Y

(SEPT. 1977).
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23
active systems is essential.
A number of designs for solar buildings can improve a utility's economic position. Areas of the country with reasonably high heating loads
commonly have adjoining electric utilities with differing peak seasons. One
utility may peak in the summer because of urban needs for air conditioning,
while its neighbor, with more rural customers, peaks in the winter. A building using an active solar hot water and space heating system might harm a
winter-peaking utility's load curve. A few miles away the same building design could help eliminate a water heating load from the utility's summer
peak. A relatively simple change in design to replenish storage with off-peak
or intermittently interrupted electric use could solve the problem for the first
24
utility.
If a utility's cost of encouraging installation of renewable energy systems
is less than or comparable to the cost of producing the same amount of energy at the margin, it might be advantageous for the utility to provide incentives for installing such systems. The increased savings result from the
ability of a utility either to reduce the use of its most expensive generating
capacity or to avoid the capital expenditures necessary to increase current
capacity.

2.

Responses of Utilities to Nonelectric Renewable Technologies

In light of these probable negative and positive effects of nonelectric
renewable technologies, utilities are likely to respond in one of two contradictory ways. First, utilities may seek to discriminate against renewable energy users, either by refusing to provide back-up power or by urging PUCs to
adopt rates that charge solar customers higher rates for back-up electricity.
Conversely, utilities may choose to encourage the introduction of renewable
technologies by participating in their marketing and commercial development. Regardless of what the utility wishes to do, however, an important
question is the legality of the utility's response.
a. Utility Discrimination Against Renewable Energy Users
(i) Service Discrimination
A regulated utility may not decline to provide backup gas or electricity
for structures equipped with nonelectric renewable energy technologies unless it can demonstrate a compelling case that backup service would cause
substantial harm to existing customers. Refusal to provide service would not
25
only transgress federal antitrust laws and state antidiscrimination statutes,
but it would also violate the utility's common law and statutory duty to
23. Lawrence & Minan, Solar Energp and Public Utility Rate Regulation, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
550, 574 (1979).
24. Sullivan, Getting Along Together, ELE CRIC POWER RESEARCH INST. J., Dec. 1978, at
18, 19.

25. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Re Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 9 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 97 (1955) (Cal.); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976);.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3 1-1 (West 1969).
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26
provide utility service.

The basic concept of a public utility is an entity that has dedicated its
property to serve the public without discrimination. Almost every state has
a statutory provision requiring utilities to provide safe and adequate service
at just and reasonable rates. The United States Supreme Court enunciated
the underlying purpose of these statutes in the following terms:
Corporations which devote their property to a public use may not
pick and choose, serving only the portions of the territory covered
by their franchises which it is presently profitable for them to serve
and restricting the development of the remaining portions by leaving their inhabitants
in discomfort without the service which they
27
alone can render.
This duty to provide adequate service has certain limits. Utilities will
be excused from providing service when prevented from doing so by acts of
God, labor disputes, and shortages of fuel. Although there is substantial precedent to the contrary, in some cases utilities have been excused from provid28
ing service when to do so would be unusually expensive.
The "duty to serve" requirement is usually interpreted on a case-by-case
basis where "reasonableness" and the "public interest" are the typical court
standards of review. If a renewable energy device requires back-up service,
the public interest probably demands that the utility provide service. Utilities may seek to avoid this duty by arguing that such devices require the
utility to build and maintain expensive peaking equipment that would only
be used infrequently (for example, when cloudy periods have drained solar
storage facilities, and the owners are consequently demanding power at the
time when demand from other customers is at its peak). This argument may
be rebutted since utilities can condition the receipt of back-up power on the
installation of equipment that will draw power from the utility only during
nonpeak periods. Even if such a condition did not eliminate the peak demand induced by solar customers, the public interest in fuel conservation
might justify the enforcement of the duty to serve.
The duty to serve could be used to encourage renewable energy applications. For example, a gas company could refuse to provide gas connections
to new residences not equipped with solar heating and cooling equipment.
Such a discriminatory practice could be viewed as "reasonable" if there were
natural gas shortages. Some states have already taken measures to condition
29
the receipt of gas on the implementation of various conservation measures.
26. See Hodel & Wendel, The Duty and Responsibility of Oregon Pub/ic Agencies to Provide Adequate andSufitzini Electnial Utility Service, 54 OR.L. REv. 539 (1975); Note, The Duty of a Utility to
Render Adequate Service. ItsScope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312 (1962).
27. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917). For a general
discussion of a utility's duty to serve, see Hodel & Wendel, supra note 26.
One key federal statute, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (Supp. III 1979), specifically requires utilities to provide back-up power for electricityproducing renewable technologies (z"e., "small power producers").
28. Compare Corporation Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 55 Ariz. 173, 99 P.2d 702 (1940)
with Re Union Elec. Co., 90 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 194 (1950) (Mo.).
29. See, e.g., New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case 26206 (Apr. 16, 1974), where New York

banned the use of natural gas in buildings without adequate insulation; see also Colorado Pub.
Util. Comm'n Decision No. 87640 (Oct. 21, 1975).
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Rate Discrimination
legality of rates harmful to users of renewable
energy devices

It has been demonstrated above how economic problems can be created
for a utility supplying back-up service to nonelectric renewable energy users.
These problems arise because most utility customers require service during
the entire year, but renewable energy users require back-up service only
when the storage capacity of their systems has been expended. Furthermore,
the demand for backup service is likely to coincide with peak demand
30
periods.
Renewable energy use may affect rates for solar customers. Public utility rates have traditionally been based on cost-of-service principles. The primary principle is that a utility, by law, is entitled to recover all its costs.
Utilities generally incur three kinds of costs: 1) service costs (metering and
billing of customers); 2) energy costs (purchase of fuel); and 3) demand costs
(plant-related costs). Because renewable energy users may add to the utility's demand costs, by requiring the utility to invest in excess capacity, application of cost-of-service principles could result in high rates.
High rates for renewable energy users would necessarily be discriminatory. Such rates are probably not illegal because of the principle that utilities may discriminate between classes of customers if there is a reasonable
basis for distinguishing them. 3 ' Users of decentralized renewable energy devices may be distinguished because of the unpredictable nature of their demand for power, their use of less gas and electricity than other customers,
and their ability to use storage facilities to control the time of day they demand power.
Moreover, despite state laws prohibiting utility discrimination, 32 several
cases have interpreted these laws so that it will be difficult to challenge rate
structures that adversely affect renewable energy users. 33 Other cases have
30. The annual peak load or peak demand represents the maximum power requirement
upon the utility, and therefore determines the necessary plant size. Gas distribution utilities
frequently experience their annual peak load during the coldest days of the year. Some electric
utilities also experience a winter annual peak load. If a solar hot water or solar space heating
unit does not operate during these winter-peaking periods, the user will want to draw conventional power from the utility. Similarly, for electric utilities peaking during the summer due to
air conditioning loads, solar users will rely on utility-furnished electricity because solar space
cooling systems are not as efficient as conventional air conditioning. In order to satisfy the total
demand for energy during these peak periods, the utility must have adequate generating capacity. However, since the back-up demand from solar users is only intermittent, the utility might
have to invest in excess capacity to meet this peaking demand. For a discussion of public utility
economics, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); P. GARFIELD &
W. LovEjoY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS (1964); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970); id. vol. 2 (1971); A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969). For a discussion of factors that create either winter or
summer-peaking utilities see THE AEROSPACE CORP., SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF
BUILDINGS (SHACOB) REQUIREMENTS, DEFINITION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS, INTERIM REPORT 2 (1977); Lawrence & Minan, supra note 19, at 236.

31. See Hicks v. City of Monroe Util. Comm'n, 29 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 275 (1959)
(La.); A. PRIEST, supra note 30.
32. Se supra note 25.
33. See A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 288.
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also upheld the legality of rate structures that provide a direct subsidy for
the use of one source of energy (electricity),34 and in these jurisdictions a rate
structure incidentally burdening a competing source of energy would also be
valid.
A renewable energy user may also seek relief from discriminatory rates
under federal antitrust statutes. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Power Act of 192035 provides no clear legislative intent to make the
antitrust laws inapplicable to electric utilities. It has further held that the
actions of the utility in refusing to sell at wholesale constitute anticompetitive and monopolistic practices in violation of section two of the Sherman
Act. 36 Under these principles, a decision to punish users of renewable energy
with exorbitant rates, if based on a desire to protect its monopoly position,
might be deemed anticompetitive and in violation of the Sherman Act. In
another case, 37 the Court has held that the "state action" exemption to application of the antitrust laws does not apply by the mere fact of state utility
commission approval of a utility practice. 38 Therefore, a commission-approved utility rate practice that discriminates either for or against renewable
energy users does not appear to have a state action exemption from the antitrust laws.
The Court has also held that a municipality adopting discriminatory
practices, in providing utility services in furtherance of its own policies, may
be subject to federal antitrust laws. Only when a municipality has acted
39
pursuant to the state's command would the state action exemption apply.
Thus, both investor-owned and municipally-owned electric utilities could be
subject to antitrust scrutiny if their pricing practices were monopolistic. A
renewable energy user could maintain that high back-up rates, designed to
slow the commercialization of renewable energy, are anticompetitive and so
monopolistic as to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
The United States Constitution is unlikely to provide restraints on discriminatory rates for or against renewable energy users. Under the fourteenth amendment, it is unconstitutional for "any state" to deprive any
person of property without due process of law. 40 Violations cannot occur,
however, through the actions of private persons or groups. 4 The actions of
a municipally-owned utility are likely to be considered "state actions" and
subject to fourteenth amendment prohibitions. 42 On the other hand, the
34. For cases upholding rates that tend to benefit specific classes of customers see Rossi v.
Garton, 60 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 210 (1965); Re Promotional Activities by Gas & Elec.
Corps., 68 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 162 (1967); Gifford v. Central Me. Power Co., 63 PUB. U.
REP. 3d (PUR) 208 (1966); Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 9 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
369 (1975) (Okla).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
36. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
37. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
38. Se. gentrally Gross, Impact of the Antitrust Laws on the Commercialization of Solar
Heating and Cooling, SERI Rept. No. TR-62-272 (June 1979).
39. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
41. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
42. See Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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actions of an investor-owned utility, even PUC-approved discriminatory actions, might not constitute sufficient state action.4 3 In the absence of state
action, due process challenges based upon the fourteenth amendment will
fail.
Even if state action can be shown, the solar customer seeking to invalidate the practice on constitutional grounds must show that the practice is a
denial of property without due process. While the United States Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this question, lower courts have suggested
that a solar user would find no relief in the fourteenth amendment. One
lower federal court has even concluded that residential users of electricity do
not have a property interest protected by the due process clause in the rates
they pay. 44
If discriminatory rates for solar users are considered legal, two aspects of
nonelectric renewable technologies may mitigate the negative aspects of such
rates. First, depending upon the solar unit's storage capability, owners
might advantageously be able to alter the timing of the demands for back-up
service. If solar back-up demand coincides with the days of high demand for
conventional service, then the utility is justified in charging its solar customers higher rates. However, if solar storage allows the demand to be concentrated on off-peak hours, the on-peak demand will be diminished and the
utility will be more likely to satisfy the needs of all classes of energy consumers without expanding plant capacity. Such a result would justify lower
45
rates to solar users.
The second mitigating factor is that PUCs may impose rates that discriminate ti favor of renewable energy users. Because renewable energy systems have the potential to reduce some utility capacity expansion and fuel
expenditures, and thereby cut costs to all customers, it could be argued that
promotional rates benefiting renewable energy users are neither unreasonable nor unlawful. This form of benign discrimination is consistent with national policy goals of energy conservation and environmental protection.
Utility commissions and courts have supported programs to finance the installation of insulation, and have prohibited the end-uses of energy not contributing to conservation. 46 A program directly assisting solar customers,
while indirectly benefiting other customers, may similarly be found
47
reasonable.
43. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). If a PUC initiates state
involvement by ordmnhg that a discriminatory practice be undertaken by the utility, then a sufficiently close nexus to state action is likely to exist. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S.
451 (1952).
44. See Georgia Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Wood v. Public Util. Comm'n, 83 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 494 (1971) (Cal.).
45. See generally deGrasse, Elecn'c Storage Heating After Two Years, 99 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.

6, 1977, at 23.
46. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 10 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 478 (1975) (D.C.); Re
Pacific Power & Light Co., 69 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 367 (1967) (Idaho); In re Mich. Consol.
Gas Co. for Authorization of a Program for the Conservation of Natural Gas, 1 PUB. U. REP.
4th (PUR) 229 (1973) (Mich.); National Swimming Pool Inst. v. Kahn, 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 237 (1975) (N.Y.).
47. Some states have passed legislation that forbids increased rates for solar back-up. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 156 (West Supp. 1981-82).
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(b) alternative rate structures for the renewable energy
user

In light of these legal and economic considerations, there are a number
of alternative rate structures to impose on nonelectric renewable energy technologies. Before discussing alternative rate structures for the solar user, however, it is important to repeat that all rates must allow the utility to recover
its costs. Moreover, a utility's notion of cost can have an important impact
on rates charged to solar customers.
There are basically two definitions of cost that a utility may use in seeking to charge rates: average cost and marginal cost. Using the average cost
approach, utilities calculate their revenue requirements and then allocate
the costs among various classes of customers (e.g., residential, industrial,
commercial) on the basis of the energy and demand patterns of each of these
classes. The allocated costs then provide the basis to set rates. Because owners of renewable energy systems require backup systems, often at the utility's
peak, such customers have higher capacity costs per increment of power consumed. Using the average cost approach, regular rates applied to such users
may result in an under recovery of costs, thereby justifying a higher rate for
their class.
This average cost methodology may be criticized for including less expensive costs incurred in the past, and for excluding the more expensive replacement costs of supplying additional units of service. As an alternative to
average costs, many economists and some utilities have proposed basing
rates on marginal costs, which provide a more correct price signal to the
customer. 48 In most cases, marginal costs can be expected to be higher than
average costs due to escalating fuel costs, the high costs of capital, and environmental protection requirements. Marginally cost-based time-differentiated rates would solve the problem of underrecovery of revenues from
renewable energy users that may occur with average cost-based rates. When
such a user requires peak use of electricity, then the price paid under a rate
based on marginal costs would reflect the higher costs of providing that service. Likewise, the cost of using auxiliary energy during off-peak periods
would be lower than at peak periods. Such a rate structure would create an
incentive for the renewable energy user to install either a load control device
or a large thermal storage component to avoid paying the higher peak price
of auxiliary energy.
Given significant market penetration of renewable energy systems,
properly designed active solar units using utility energy mainly during offpeak periods could reduce both the short and long term marginal costs of
utilities. Systems that perform well during summer peaks and that are
designed to utilize off-peak energy may reduce a utility's short-run marginal
costs by reducing the demand for high cost peaking fuels. In the long run,
such systems could delay or reduce the need for some peaking capacity. The
use of off-peak energy could also increase the efficiency of power generation
48. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 5 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 28

(1974).
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by spreading out the demand for energy, facilitating greater use of base and
intermediate load equipment.
Despite the seeming benefits of marginally based rates, utilities and
PUCs have traditionally based rates on average rather than marginal costs.
Therefore, it is from this average cost viewpoint that they have addressed the
issue of appropriate rates for users of renewable energy devices. One method
that might be used to recover costs from such customers is the standby
charge. In its most inflexible form, this would be a capacity charge for the
connected load for which standby service is being provided. The rationale
for this rate is that the utility is obligated to "stand by" and be prepared to
provide service when the renewable energy system is inoperative. This
charge, aimed solely at renewable energy customers, is obviously
discriminatory.
Another proposed method to allow recovery of capacity costs is a demand-energy charge. Under such a rate schedule, a customer would receive
charges for both kilowatt-hour and kilowatt usage. This rate requires a
meter which records the maximum demand of electricity that the renewable
energy user requires. One problem with this type of tariff is that the maximum demand of the solar home does not necessarily coincide with a utility's
peak. In fact, demand-energy charges could actually encourage consumers
to shift some consumption to peak periods because demand charges encourage consumers to spread out their consumption evenly to produce better
load factors. This would result in an inefficient use of utility resources as
49
well as higher rates for consumers.
Another method of distinguishing on-peak service is to offer interruptible service to customers with back-up requirements. Under this system,
only service to certain uses, such as a storage heating systems, would be interruptible. This approach essentially divides the back-up service customer category into two groups, those with and those without adequate storage
capacity. The only customers who could realistically take advantage of the
offer of lower rates would be those with adequate storage capacity because
50
the service would only be available during off-peak hours.
Finally, the most common rate schedule is the declining block-meter
rate schedule, in which the price per unit of energy decreases for successive
blocks of consumption. The application of this rate to both back-up and
conventional service classes can result in the latter further subsidizing the
back-up service group. Under this method, rates charged for each block depend on projected maximum demand and customer load factors for the average customer in the class. Consumers requiring back-up service may have
reduced energy requirements that do not exceed the amount of service pro49. See, e.g., In re Proposed Increased Rates & Charges Contained in Tariff Revisions Filed
by the Public Service Co. of Colorado, No. 87460 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Oct. 21, 1975).
50. For an example of interruptible service, see Gilbert & deGrasse, Prospectsfor Electnc
Utili'y Load Management, 96 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 28, 1975, at 15, which describes the special
contract offered by the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation.
Federal standards regarding ratemaking included in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. IV 1980), suggest the availability of interruptible rates for
industrial and commercial electricity consumers. Id. § I11 (d)(5).
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vided in the first block of the rate schedule. Monthly bills for these customers might cover customer and energy costs, but only part of the demand costs
associated with back-up service. Hence, rate adjustments enabling the utility to recover its full costs would result in subsidization of the back-up class
by the conventional residential class.
Arguably, the national interest justifies this result because it may provide an economic impetus to the development of renewable energy. However, this method is probably inadequate to provide such an impetus. The
approach is analogous to proposed lifeline rates, which provide a low rate for
those least able to afford electricity. Both policies place strong emphasis
upon considerations other than costs as factors in support of a rate design
that results in interclass subsidization. Renewable energy users are likely to
be members of the upper economic stratum who can afford the initial investment in solar collecting equipment. Therefore, regulatory commissions, having already demonstrated their resistance to lifeline rates for the poor, will be
reluctant to adopt a policy which results in rate subsidies for the wealthy. 5 1
Even if this proposal were accepted by a number of commissions, it
would remain an unreliable means of encouraging the utilization of renewable energy. Due to the disparate distribution of pecuniary benefits and burdens, such a policy would surely be attacked in the courts as unduly
discriminatory. If the policy survived judicial review, which seems unlikely
in view of the reception given lifeline rate proposals, uncertainty over the
eventual outcome of the legal review process would undermine the incentive
52
to use decentralized renewable energy.
b.

Utility Participation in the Development of Nonelectric,
Decentralized Renewable Energy Applications

Should utilities or their regulatory bodies decide to participate in the
development of nonelectric renewable technologies, four major issues arise.
First, given their regulated monopoly status, should utilities be allowed to
compete with private market participants? Second, if utilities are allowed to
compete in renewable energy development, does such involvement give rise
to antitrust and restraint of trade concerns? Third, since utility involvement
can range from simple data collection to aggressive marketing and financing
of renewable energy devices, what are the economic and institutional consequences of these different actions? Fourth, what legal and regulatory issues
confront utilities engaged in active commercialization of renewable energy
devices? These questions are discussed below in more detail.
(i)

Utility Involvement in the Renewable Energy Market

There are several reasons utilities should become involved in renewable
energy development. From a social perspective, utility interest may bring
51.

Utility commission opposition to lifeline rates is reflected in East Ohio Gas Co., 16

PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 137, 156 (1976) (Ohio); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadel-

phia Elec. Co., 91 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372-75 (1971).(Pa.); Madison Gas & Elec. Co.,
17 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 109, 124 (1976) (Wis.).
52. Set J. BONBRIGHT, 5upra note 30, at 116-17.
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the energy to the public at attractive cost levels. Should they wish to lease or
sell solar systems, it is likely that utilities could overcome the cost-intensive
nature of renewable energy business ventures and achieve economies of scale
that translate into lower prices. Utility ownership and sale of renewable energy devices might help assure potential users of product quality. Further,
most utilities' existing service, sales, distribution, maintenance, and administrative operations (e.g., billing procedures) could easily be adapted to a re53
newable energy leasing scheme.
Since many nonelectric renewable energy technologies have the potential to affect electric utility system load factors adversely, utilities may find it
advantageous to participate in their operation and development. Utility
control of the devices might ensure that the devices are designed as effective
load management tools. For example, active solar heating systems beneficial
to the utility's load factor use auxiliary energy only during off-peak periods.
Under utility ownership, such devices could be controlled to help assure that
54
auxiliary demand did not occur coincidentally with the system's peak.
If utilities take an interest in renewable energy development, what policy should govern their participation? The four policies advanced most frequently are: 1) utilities, being classified as regulated monopolies, are given
exclusive monopoly franchises to own, sell, lease, or market renewable energy
systems; 2) utilities are allowed to enter the market, but are regulated and
are not given exclusive franchises; 3) nonregulated utility subsidiary companies are allowed to enter the competitive renewable energy market; and
4) utilities are prohibited from owning, for lease or sale, systems located
55
upon a customer's premises.
These four policies have been implemented in other regulated industries. Prior to the Federal Communication Commission's Carterfone decision,5 6 telephone companies had exclusive control over the interconnection
devices used in the telephone system-a situation reflected in the first option.
Each customer was required to purchase the internal interconnection system
from the local telephone company. If this ownership policy is applied to
renewable energy devices, a customer desiring a device using back-up energy
would be required to purchase or lease the system from that utility.
After Carterfone, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) leased, and sometimes sold, customer premise equipment (CPE)
under a scheme reflecting the second policy option. Telephone companies
53. See general

R. BEZDEK, J. MARGOLIN, T. SPERROW, C. SPONSLER, A. EZRA, R.

SPONBERG, A. MILLER, E. MEEKER, E. ROSEMEN & M. MISCH, ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS
FOR ACCELERATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING SYSTEMS 227-28
(Program Policy Studies in Science & Technology publisher 1978); BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON,
INC., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL 6

(Federal Energy Admin. publisher 1976); Hirshberg & Schoen, Bamrns to the Widespread Utiiza"ion of Residential Solar Energy: The Prospectsfor Solar Energ in US Housinsg Industy, 5 POL'Y SCI.
453, 468 (1974).
54. See S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRICING, supra note 22, at 117; H. LORsCH,
supra note 22, at 3.
55. See Laitos & Feuerstein, supra note 15, at 40; Noll, MaintainingCompetitionin Solar Energ
Technology, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE SOLAR ENERGY MARKET: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 179, 181-2 (1978).

56. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
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were allowed to market CPE devices, but they no longer had an exclusive
monopoly. Customers could either obtain their telephones and other CPE
devices from the telephone company at a regulated rental price (or in some
instances purchase at regulated prices), or purchase them from an unregulated competitive supplier. Under a similar scheme, a renewable energy customer could lease the renewable energy system from a utility at a regulated
rental rate or purchase the system from an unregulated supplier.
The third policy option exists where regulated gas and electric utilities
control unregulated subsidiary companies engaging in activities such as mining, energy resource exploration, and the selling of appliances. In the renewable energy industry, this option would place an unregulated utility
subsidiary in competition with other suppliers of renewable energy devices.
The extent of direct utility involvement with renewable energy system marketing through the subsidiary would be governed by the nature of the PUC
jurisdiction over the utility.
AT&T also exemplified the fourth policy, which is prohibition from engaging in a certain business activity. For over a decade, AT&T was generally prohibited from engaging in unregulated sales of certain
communications equipment. Following a 1956 consent decree that settled
an antitrust complaint against the Bell System, AT&T could not enter industries such as data processing. 57 Computer time-sharing services that utilized telephone lines for connecting remote data terminals to central
computers could be offered only by telephone utilities not affiliated with the
Bell System. Under a similar option, the renewable energy industry would
not be faced with competition from utilities or their unregulated
subsidiaries.
Granting utilities monopoly franchises and prohibiting their involvement in renewable energy development are undesirable options. The natural monopoly rationale that normally supports the restriction of free entry
into business does not apply to the renewable energy industry. On the other
hand, the fears underlying a prohibition of entry by utilities may be
exaggerated.
Three traditional reasons support monopoly status for utilities: natural
monopoly conditions, the need to allocate limited physical resources, and the
presence of potentially destructive economic competition. These criteria do
58
not justify extending utilities a monopoly solar franchise.
A single supplier of a product is most efficient when it can decrease unit
costs over the entire range of demand. This natural monopoly position can
be achieved only when an industry realizes significant economies of scale.
Although utilities realize economies of scale in the generation and transmission of electricity, and in distributing natural gas, those efficiencies are not
applicable to utility commercialization of renewable energy equipment.
Neither the manufacturing nor the marketing of such devices has technological advantages related to the size of output giving rise to economies of scale.
57. United States v. Western Elec. Co.,

(1956]

TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

68,246.

58. See Lawrence & Minan, Competitie Aspects of Utilio Partiipation,supra note 30, at 253-
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The need to limit physical resources is a second justification for restricting market entry. Examples include the television and radio broadcasting
industries (due to limited number of frequencies) and hydroelectric facilities
(because of a limited number of appropriate dam locations on rivers). By
contrast, the resources for the development of renewable energy are
abundant.
The third rationale for limiting entry into the solar market is that economic competition may lead to a deterioration of service quality. This was
at least part of the early justification for allowing electric and natural gas
monopolies. While unrestrained competition has the potential to affect adversely the quality of the product sold, the problem does not necessarily require direct restraints on entry; well-conceived quality control standards and
financial responsibility legislation could achieve the same objectives.
The other extreme would be the absolute prohibition of utility participation. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA)59 originally prohibited utilities from supplying, installing, or financing solar
devices. 6° This prohibition stemmed largely from the fear that utilities could
strategically use renewable energy technologies to create internal subsidies
and, thereby, recapture monopoly profits and foreclose competition. For example, if a joint solar/gas utility could affect an allocation between solarassisted and gas-only services that attributed too much to gas, it would succeed in taking advantage of its monopoly in the gas business to subsidize its
solar energy business.

6

1

Utilities might also find it economical to acquire a company in the business of manufacturing renewable energy devices instead of purchasing the
devices. Utilities would thus become vertically integrated, similar to the nation's large oil companies. Such practices are conducive to price maneuvering within the different levels of the industry, which in turn supresses
62
competition.
While these concerns about unfair competition are legitimate, utility
involvement might improve rather than harm competition. It might reduce
the significance of the psychological and economic barriers that deter private
firms from installing renewable energy systems. Deterred by unfamiliarity
with such systems, as well as by their high initial cost, many private companies have not been willing to risk investing in renewable energy technologies.
The utility's size and market stature may help reduce industry and consumer
uncertainty about renewable energy systems and open up the market. Such
59. 42 U.S.C. § 8201 (Supp. III 1979).

60. Id. § 216.
61.

See Bossong, The Case Against Plliate Utility Involvement in Solar/InsulationPrograms, SOLAR

AGE, Jan. 1978, at 23, 24.
62. See Laitos & Feuerstein, Regulated Utilities and Solar Energy: A Legal-Economic
Analysis of the Major Issues Affecting Solar Commercialization Effort, SERI Rep. No. TR-62255, at 16 (June 1979).
Another argument advanced to justify restrictions on utility participation is based on the
assumption that since profits are proportional to the value of property included in the rate base,
utilities have a tendency to overcapitalize, ie., to invest in overly durable equipment to increase
the value of the rate base. See Averch & Johnson, &rhaviorof the Firm under Reguatoty Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
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considerations contributed to the 1980 amendment of NECPA, which re63
moved most of the earlier restrictions on utility solar involvement.
If the dangers of participation do not warrant absolute prohibitions
against utilities, and if natural monopoly conditions are not necessarily present, then the optimal degree of utility involvement in renewable energy development appears to be some form of competition with other private
enterprises. Such competition could occur with either regulation or
nonregulation of the utilities' renewable energy activities.
(ii)

Regulating Utility Involvement in Renewable Energy
Development: Antitrust Concerns

The question of utility regulation hinges in part on the ownership of the
utility to be regulated. Municipal and federally-owned utilities, for example, are controlled by a different set of legal principles than investor-owned
utilities.64 For investor-owned utilities, the first question concerning controls
on their involvement in renewable energy development is whether this kind
of activity may be regulated by the state PUC. The principles that subject a
business enterprise to regulation were initially outlined in Nebbt'a v. New
York. 65 Based on those principles, both courts and administrative agencies
continue to distinguish between utility transactions that are "public" and
subject to regulation, and those that are "private" and beyond regulatory
supervision.
Unfortunately, these authorities provide little assistance in distinguishing the two types of transactions. The same practice has been treated as
private in one jurisdiction and public in another. However, the courts and
commissions generally agree that the resolution of the issue turns on the relation of the questioned activity to the central function of the utility, which is
to furnish the most efficient and satisfactory gas and electric service at the
lowest reasonable price. As the questioned practice becomes more intimately related to the utility's duty to serve, and as its potential impact on
service increases, the practice is more likely to be viewed as a proper utility
function and subject to regulation.
A program designed to encourage renewable energy use is arguably
consistent with utility functions. If total energy consumption is to continue
to increase, some utilities must increase their available capacity. By encouraging the use of decentralized renewable energy, a utility can effectively augment the amount of available energy. Expanding capacity has always been
a proper utility function, and hence, encouraging the use of renewable energy may also be considered a proper function. 66 If renewable energy development activities are considered a utility function, such activities would be
67
considered "public" and subject to PUC regulation.
63. Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. III 1979).
64. Set supra note 7.
65. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
66. See Competitive Aspects of Utility Participation,supra note 30, at 272-73.
67. A utility is likely to view PUC regulation as desirable because of the opportunities for
cost sharing and risk spreading. The obvious benefit would be the inclusion of its renewable
energy expenditures in its rate base. The rate of return allowed by the regulatory commission
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Regulation by state PUCs is only the most direct form of utility control.
Utilities interested in participation in renewable energy development must
also be sensitive to a range of federal and state laws that will control the
nature of the utility's participation. The most important of these is antitrust
law, which is applicable to utilities unless the questioned activity is ordered
and actively supervised by a PUC. 68 Certain utility renewable energy programs may be in conflict with two major antitrust doctrines. First, a utility
which finances or installs renewable energy systems for its customers may be
found to have tied the sale of its traditionally furnished energy to the installation of the system. Second, the utility might be held to have foreclosed the
market (its customers) to potential renewable energy system competitors.
Both of these practices raise antitrust concerns.
Judicial hostility to tying arrangements is strong, and generally only
two conditions need be present to give rise to a presumption of illegality.
First, the seller must have sufficient economic power over the tying product
to restrain the market appreciably. Second, interstate commerce must be
affected. A renewable energy incentive program with these two conditions
could be held to be an illegal tying arrangement. Furthermore, the utility69is
not insulated from the antitrust laws by the fact of regulatory approval.

The second antitrust difficulty facing utilities is the illegal vertical restriction, most commonly called the franchise. While there are many
franchise configurations, the most important one for a renewable energy incentive program is the exclusive dealership plan. Under this type of plan,
the franchisee is granted an exclusive right to market a product as the
franchisor's authorized representative. This plan would be illegal if unduly
70
restrained competition resulted through market foreclosure.
A utility could structure its renewable energy program to avoid the
traditional form of exclusive dealing plan by authorizing a single dealer
would apply equally to this investment as to the expenditures for conventional capital, and bad
debts resulting from customer accounts would be allowable as an operating expense. The regulatory process would therefore provide a guaranteed opportunity to earn an established rate of
return on invested capital.
Competitors entering the renewable energy business may seek to prevent utilities from obtaining the advantages of a regulated rate of return. The thrust of the competitors' argument
will be that the utility's renewable energy involvement is beyond the jurisdiction of the PUC
approving the rate of return.
68. Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Cantor modified Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), where the Supreme Court indicated that some forms of state authorization
exempted utilities from the federal antitrust laws. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
69. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). After Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), a utility company's refusal to lease a renewable
energy device to certain customers, or to purchase such devices from manufacturers (grounded
on a desire to protect its monopoly position), may be deemed anticompetitive and in violation
of the Sherman Act.
In addition, the regulations implementing the residential conservation service (RCS) requirements of NECPA prohibit utilities participating in the RCS program from discriminating
unfairly among contractors, customers, suppliers, and installers of solar measures. 10 C.F.R.
§ 456.308(d)(e) (1981).
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either to produce the systems or to install qualified systems not manufactured by the utility. Such factual differences, however, are immaterial. The
utility would still be using its substantial economic power and leverage to
give its authorized representative dominance in the market, a result particularly likely in the nonelectric renewable energy market due to its decentralized nature. Most firms currently producing such systems or system
components are small, although a number of large national or multinational
firms are beginning to enter the market. The economic advantages to these
small companies of an exclusive dealership would be substantial in light of
the market power of utilities.
Another portion of the federal antitrust laws, the Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act, 71 prohibits price discrimination in goods of like
grade and quantity where the effect of such conduct is to lessen competition
substantially or to tend to create a monopoly. Actual harm need not result
to competition; only a reasonable "possibility" of such harm would be sufficient for a cause of action. 72 If a utility or its subsidiary received quantity
discounts for the purchase of renewable energy devices, competition might
be impaired and the transaction would possibly violate the Robinson-Pat-.
man Act.
A Clayton Act 73 violation may occur if a utility or a subsidiary enters
into an agreement with its renewable energy system supplier to deal exclusively in the supplier's products rather than those of a competitor. Under
this federal statute, a company may not sell goods on the condition that the
recipient not buy from a competitor, if the effect of such a transaction may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 74 If utilities

prevent buyers from purchasing renewable energy devices from competitors,
this economic power would create a presumptive Clayton Act violation.
State trade laws have an effect on utility participation in the renewable
energy market that is similar to that of the antitrust statutes. These trade
laws are intended to safeguard the public against the creation of monopolies
and to encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory
practices. These statutes often declare it unlawful for any corporation engaged in the sale of any product or service to discriminate between different
locations. However, the statutes usually provide an exception for any service
or product sold or furnished by a public utility regulated by the PUC or by a
municipal regulatory body. Where utility ownership of renewable energy
devices is regulated by a PUC, rental prices for the equipment will not be
subject to scrutiny. However, the rental charged by an unregulated subsidiary, as well as the prices charged by manufacturers who supply renewable
energy devices to either utilities or subsidiaries, would be subject to these
75
statutes.
Moreover, agreements or contracts intended to prevent competition are
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13b, 21a (1976).
72. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).

73. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
74. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FrC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
75. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-101 to -117 (1973).
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often illegal restraints of trade in most states. Corporations engaging in any
combination, conspiracy, or agreement restraining trade, or combining or
conspiring to monopolize any part of the trade, are guilty of an unlawful
conspiracy. 76 Unlike price discrimination, an exemption from application of
these statutes is not afforded to investor-owned or municipally-owned public
utilities. Therefore, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies between a renewable energy system supplier and a utility or subsidiary would be suspect
77
where the effect is to prevent competition.
Federal antitrust and state trade laws regulate only certain incidents of
utility involvement in renewable energy development. A far more restrictive
form of regulation is one which prohibits all utility involvement in renewable energy activities. Utilities could be regulated out of the renewable energy market in three ways. First, the state PUC could prohibit utility
commercialization activities through either its rules and regulations or
through its general policy positions.7 8 Second, a state legislature, operating
pursuant to the state's police power, could enact laws that either prohibit
utility renewable energy involvement or prescribe the extent to which a utility subsidiary could become involved. 79 Third, federal law could foreclose
certain utility relationships with the renewable energy market. Before it was
amended by the Energy Security Act of 1980,80 NECPA prohibited most
commercial forms of utility involvement in renewable energy
development.1'
(iii)

Alternative Types of Utility Involvement in
Renewable Energy Development

Utility involvement in decentralized renewable energy development
could occur in various ways. The utility role could be similar to the role
utilities played in promoting electric and gas appliances. Alternatively, utili76. See,e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (Supp. 1980).
77. Se Q-T Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 1975).
78. Before a state PUC could so prohibit a utility it usually must be shown that such
involvement "affects" or "could affect' the utility's regulated business. See D. TURNER,
TRENDS AND ToPics IN UTILITY REGULATION 20 (1969).

79. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
80. Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. IV 1980).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 8217(a) (Supp. III 1979).
A unique situation arises if municipally-owned utilities seek to become involved in decentralized renewable energy development. In most states an exemption from regulation by the
PUC is provided in the state constitution, or is recognized in the PUC jurisdiction section of the
state law. PUC jurisdiction attaches only if the municipal utility operates outside city boundaries. If a municipality were to furnish renewable energy devices to its customers within the
municipal limits, the city's officers would possess the sole power of fixing general regulation.
The extent of this regulation is generally provided in the city charter. The city council usually
approves the utility's rates within municipal boundaries, as well as the utility's general functions. See, e.g., City of Loveland v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Colo. 298, 301-03, 580
P.2d 381, 383-85 (1978); COLO.CONST. art. XXV; COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO., CHARTER art.

VI, § 34.1 (1977).
For an argument in favor of municipal utility participation in the renewable energy market, see supra note 61, at 6. See aLroCity of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978), holding that municipally-owned utilities are not necessarily always immune from
federal antitrust laws.
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ties could become more actively involved by financing, leasing, or selling
renewable energy systems with utility-backed warranties.
Regulatory bodies guarantee utilities a rate of return on their investments by imposing appropriate rates on customers. For many years, a utility's best interest was advanced by selling as much power as possible.
Accordingly, PUCs adopted declining block rates, which tended to encourage power consumption, and utilities promoted energy-intensive appliances. 82 By the late 1970's some utilities were no longer able to guarantee
customers sufficient power because of oil and gas shortages, nuclear shutdowns, the environmental effects of coal, and the exhaustion of new hydroelectric sites. These utilities were, therefore, no longer as interested in selling
maximum amounts of power, but rather, became concerned about ways of
reducing demand. Because decentralized, nonelectric renewable energy devices reduce the need for utility-supplied power, utilities experiencing or an83
ticipating fuel or capacity problems may be interested in these devices.
Conversely, since unrestricted use of such devices can have adverse effects on
utility load profiles and revenues, an active campaign to promote systems
reducing the likelihood of on-peak usage can ease the problems arising from
widespread penetrations of renewable energy systems in utility service
84
areas.
If utilities take a role in the development of decentralized renewable
systems, and if the role parallels the way utilities promoted gas and electric
appliances, they can be expected to engage in consumer education, general
incentive programs, data collection, and the development of quality assurance standards. If utilities use less traditional, more aggressive means to promote renewable energy devices, they may become involved in the actual
marketing of these devices. This role would allow a utility to install or service, own, sell, lease, or finance solar systems.
(a)

traditional utility roles and renewable energy
development

Consumer Education. Consumer education by utilities can take several
forms. Utilities can promote renewable energy use by advertising, by demonstration projects, and by making available to customers records of their
energy use. 85 A more dramatic and direct form of consumer education is the
82. A review of the legality and propriety of merchandising gas and electric appliances by

utility companies is found in D. TURNER, supra note 78, at 707-10. The primary legal issue is
whether such marketing activity is a proper and traditional utility role which may be regulated
by the state PUC.
83. See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, THE TRANSITIONAL STORM 3 (1970); THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 149-50 (Electrical World ed. 1949); M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC
UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT,

AND OWNERSHIP

198-99 (1979); E.

VENNARD, THE

ELECTRIC POWER BUSINESS 160 (2d ed. 1970); G. WILSON, J. HERRING & R. EUTSLER, PUBLIC
UTILITY INDUSTRIES 94-95 (1936); Netschert, Then and Now with Utility Advertising and Marketing,
102 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 9, 1978, at 17; PEPCO: A UTILITY LEARNS TO PROSPER BY
AVOIDING GROWTH, BUS. WEEK, June 8, 1981, at 137; Mid-US Utilities Shocked by Load Projections, Will Lean on Save-a-Watt, ELEC. WEEK 7 (Feb. 9, 1981).
84. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
85. In 1980 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a New York PUC ban on all
promotional advertising by the utility, in part because such an order would prevent utilities
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residential conservation service. program contained in NECPA, which requires most utilities to offer an energy audit to all customers in certain residential buildings.8 6 Such audits inform homeowners of the estimated cost of
purchasing and installing conservation and renewable energy measures, and
the savings resulting from such a retrofit.
Incentive Arograms. The most obvious form of renewable energy incentive
is a rate structure which does not penalize the renewable energy user, and
does not harm the economic condition of the utility. From both the customer and utility perspective, time-of-day rates based on marginal costs appear more likely to achieve this ideal than non-time-differentiated rates
based on average accounting CoStS. 8 7 If the utility wanted to impose an economic disincentive to nonrenewable use it could petition the PUC to add a
surcharge to customer bills when some percentage of the energy consumed
was not from renewable sources. If the utility wanted to support an economic incentive to renewable energy use it could seek to have the legislature
enact tax laws favorable to renewable technologies.88
Data Collection. Collecting load survey and climate data to predict the
effect that decentralized renewable energy systems will have on future loads
is a logical utility role. Utilities might engage in renewable energy assessment studies, monitor individual test sites, or fund the large-scale testing of
demonstration systems. They might even wish to participate in technical
research and development work. The impact of decentralized renewable energy devices on a utility's load is difficult to assess. Most utilities, regardless
of whether they are interested in promoting such devices, at least have an
interest in anticipating the probable effects of customer use. 89
Quality Controls. A utility could help provide quality controls for renewable energy devices in two ways. It could develop energy efficiency standards, and it could offer a warranty for the devices used by customers.
Because utilities need to predict accurately the impacts of renewable technologies on the utility's load, and because both forms of quality control enhance renewable energy system reliability, utilities may find developing such
controls advantageous.
The NECPA residential conservation service program already ensures
some utility-backed quality control. If a utility auditor determines renewa"from promoting... services that reduce energy use ....
" Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980). See alro Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 8216(a) (Supp. III 1979); 10 C.F.R. § 456.307-.506. Section 456.106 of the
RCS regulations provides that no utility that arranges for financing or for installation of solar
devices may be held liable for unsatisfactory solar system performance by virtue of its RCS role.
87. See su/ra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. See Minan & Lawrence, State Tax ncentives to Promote the Use of Solar Enery, 56 TEx. L.
REV. 835 (1978).
89. See Electric Power Research Institute, Electric Utility Solar Energy Activities, 1979
Survey (EPRI Rep. No. ER-1299-SR) (Dec. 1979); Laitos, Brown, & Taylor, Proceedings:
SERI-ERA Workshop on Electric Utility Involvement in Residential Solar Applications, Univ.

of Denver Law School, Denver, Colo., April 18, 1980, SERI Rep. No. CP-733-781 (Oct. 1981).
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ble energy to be a preferred application to reduce the homeowner's demand,
then the utility must offer aid in arranging for financing and installation of
the measure. Only solar measures "warranted by the manufacturer to meet
a specified level of performance over a period of not less than three years
[which also meet all applicable] Federal and State laws" may be recommended by the utility performing the audit. 9° The regulations provide further that only suppliers carrying systems meeting the Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) Intermediate Minimum Property Standards Supplement may be recommended, and suggested installation contractors must
comply with the HUD standards in installing the measures and use approved materials. 9' These statutory and regulatory requirements insure
92
some degree of product quality.
(b)

utility marketing of renewable energy systems

Insallation and Mahitenance. Poor installation can ruin the efficiency of

any system and disillusion consumers. Thus, installation is repeatedly cited
as the weak link in renewable energy applications. Since utilities have the
resources to acquire the necessary engineering capabilities, they seem suited
to address this problem. They could, for example, conduct installer training
programs leading to certification. Performance bonds could also be required
as a certification condition. Utilities could be responsible for inspecting a
93
certified installer's work and for requiring repairs when necessary.
The Energy Security Act of 1980 retains the NECPA prohibition
against utility installation of decentralized renewable energy devices, but exempts utility installations made "through contracts between [a utility] and
independent suppliers or contractors where the customer requests such supply or installation."194 It also provides that such contracts may not be subject
to utility control, renewable energy installations may not be carried out by
affiliates or subsidiaries of the utility, and such installations may not adversely affect competition in the area. 95 In addition, the NECPA residential
conservation service program requires utilities to perform installation inspections. Four of the first ten installations of active solar hot water heating and
space heating systems by each contractor must be inspected to ensure that
96
they meet the required standards.
90. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 210(11) (Supp. III 1979).
91. Sr 10 C.F.R. § 456.701 (1981). In addition, section 222 of NECPA requires the Department of Energy to consult with the National Bureau of Standards before judging the energy
efficiency of renewable energy devices, and the Federal Trade Commission to ensure that the
RCS regulations "do not operate to deceive consumers or unreasonably restrict consumer...
options."
92. For a discussion of solar warranties, see generally Jaroslovsky, Solar Equipment Warranties. Consumer troblems in Caifornia, 55 CAL. ST. B. J. 236 (1980).
93. See Smackey, Should Elecnc Ul'ities Market Solar Energy?, 102 PuB. UTIL. FORT., September 28, 1978, at 37; see also 10 C.F.R. § 456.314(o (1981), which requires all state plans
pursuant to the RCS program to devise a system for ensuring the qualifications for installers of
solar devices.
94. Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. IV 1980).
95. Id.
96. 10 C.F.R. § 456.313 (1981).
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Ownership, Sales, and Leasing. Several reasons exist for a utility to be interested in selling or leasing renewable energy systems. Most obviously, marketing of solar systems might be profitable. Another motivation is the
opportunity to influence system design in its service area. If electric utilities
are concerned about unrestricted use of auxiliary power, they will want to
play a role in ensuring that the design of systems minimizes potential negative impact on utilities.
Utility leasing and direct sales programs are controversial. Industry
representatives may be concerned that utilities not only have governmentbacked marketing advantages, but also have the capacity to compete unfairly with private firms. These fears stem from the belief that utility sales or
leases would almost certainly lead to utility domination of the renewable
97
energy field.
An alternative to direct renewable energy system sales or leasing by a
utility is the formation of a subsidiary that could compete with other suppliers for the renewable energy market. However, the subsidiary may have potential advantages over other competitors due to its relationship with a
parent company in the business of energy supply and distribution. Because
of this relationship, a consumer may view dealings with the subsidiary as
involving less risk. 98
Another method of allowing utilities to market renewable energy systems is to allow them to own-lease the system, to include the cost of the
renewable energy investments in their rate base, and to earn a return on this
investment. 99 This arrangement would allow a utility the greatest degree of
control over renewable energy systems in its territory since it would actually
own the systems. A utility would be in the best position to select systems
which could integrate most effectively with the utility's system. Utility ownership could also increase product quality since the utility would avoid using
systems which would damage its reputation. 100
If utilities invest in renewable energy systems, it will be necessary to
demonstrate that nonsolar customers will not be subject to discrimination.
Some proposals would require a degree of subsidization by these ratepayers.
These customers would not reap the short-run benefits (reduced energy bills)
that would accrue to renewable energy customers, and the long-run benefits
(lower cost energy and deferred capacity) may appear less tangible. To be
97. See Smackey, supra note 93.
98. The formation of subsidiaries by utilities is not a new concept. Many utilities have
formed subsidiaries to perform operations not specifically related to their monopoly franchise.
An example is a subsidiary formed to manage generation of fuel procurement operations for the
parent company. Though there are concerns regarding the financial impact of the subsidiary
on the parent company and the financial transactions between the two, these are not new or
insurmountable problems. Regulatory oversight, either by commissions or intervenors, reduces
the risk of financial manipulation between parent and subsidiary.
99. For an example of judicial willingness to affirm a PUC decision allowing a utility to
include expenditures for renewable energy research and development in the utility's rate base,
see Caldwell v. Public Util. Comm'n, 613 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1980).
100. NECPA and the Energy Security Act are silent on the question of utility ownershipsale-lease of solar systems, and therefore one may assume that state law will govern utility ownership and marketing strategies.
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justifiable, these benefits must equal or exceed the cost of the program.

10 1

Financing. NECPA prohibited utility financing or installation of renewable energy measures unless a waiver was first obtained from the Department of Energy. 10 2 However, the Energy Security Act of 1980 eliminated
this prohibition, thus leaving the decision to the utilities and their regulators. 10 3 Utility financing of renewable energy measures might be encouraged for several reasons. First, it has the potential of reaching a larger
market than current federal and state income tax incentive programs since
tax credits are predominatly taken by upper income persons. Another important benefit is better examination of the costs and benefits of renewables
as compared with those of conventional energy resources. Finally, it would
help alleviate the impact of the high initial cost of renewable energy
systems. 104

An important question is whether utilities are a better financing source
than existing, more traditional sources. Real and potential costs are associated with using utilities as financial intermediaries for renewable energy
commercialization. Banks and other conventional financial institutions can
obtain money at a lower cost than regulated utilities. Banks are capitalized
at roughly ninety-five percent debt, from deposits, and only five percent equity. Utilities typically have about thirty-five percent equity capital, which
is more costly than debt or preferred stock. Utility financing thus involves
an intrinsically more expensive source than might be available through conventional means. ' 05
There are other less readily quantifiable considerations of utility financing. For example, long-term loans by a utility present some problems.
While the life expectancy of solar collectors, hot water storage, and copper
plumbing may be expected to be about twenty years, other solar components
101. Gas utility marketing of solar systems involves a special set of considerations. The
direct marketing of household products utilizing gas is not a new activity to the gas utilities. In
the 1940's and 1950's many gas utilities not only sold ranges, furnaces, water heaters, and dryers, but also maintained service capabilities. These activities accelerated the adoption of gas as
a major household fuel. Similar marketing activities by gas utilities could speed the adoption of
solar hot water, heating, and space cooling systems.
One study concluded that as between gas utility-owned, gas utility-leased, and consumerpurchased renewable energy systems, utility-leased systems are the most preferable for both the
utility and the consumer. "In addition to financial benefits, which include lower monthly costs,
the utility-leased systems alternative is attractive to consumers because it imposes a high degree
of reliability and standardization for design, manufacturing, and installation." D. BOYD, J.
CASKEY, G. PRICE, P. SPEWAK, supra note 13, at 34.
One advantage to sales-leasing programs is that the capital allocation for renewable energy
and for "new," unregulated gas could be put on a more equal basis. See the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1980), which calls for phased deregulation of natural
gas prices. Investment decisions about the demand reduction advantages of renewable energy
would then be more fairly compared to the real cost of supplying gas. The qualitative differences between purchasing new sources of gas and developing renewable energy technologies
that reduce the need for new gas could be resolved by utility management.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 216(a)(2) (1976).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. III 1979).
104. See generally Kahn, Using Utilities to Finance the Solar Transition, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 543
(1980).
105. E. KAHN, L. Ross, P. BENENSON &J. CHERRY, UTILrrY SOLAR FINANCE: ECONOMIC
AND INsTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UTIIry SOLAR FINANCE].
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do not last as long. Loans may have to be geared to the replacement of these
shorter-lived components. Additionally, since the average home ownership
is seven years, many borrowers will move before the loan is fully paid.
Whether the loan would be liquidated or accepted by the new homeowner
10 6
would have to be determined.
Another major feature of a utility financing program is the use of special bonding authorities to raise relatively low cost capital. When municipalities and other specially constituted local agencies raise funds, they sell
tax-exempt bonds. One approach to this capital market is through existing
publicly-owned utilities. Special bonding authorities may also be used for
access to the tax-exempt market. 107
Utilities could also simply arrange customer financing with lending institutions. NECPA's Residential Conservation Service Program requires
utilities to arrange for financing of conservation measures, including renewable energy, that customers install as a result of an energy audit. 108 Although
the definition of "arrange" has been left to the states, the Department of
Energy has required that these arrangements must extend beyond distributing lists of lenders and information on shopping for loans.
Another utility lender option is for utilities to subsidize interest rates on
loans. A utility could make payments to a lender equal to the difference
between revenues from a loan at the lender's normal rate and the subsidized
rate. The payments could be made annually or at the time the loan was
taken out. Such a program would be enhanced if it were operated in conjunction with lending institutions offering the longest loan periods. The subsidy would be included in the utility's rates. The amount of subsidy a utility
is willing to undertake would depend upon the cost reductions it could expect from the use of renewable energy.109
106. Despite these concerns, in 1980 the California Public Utilities Commission ordered
California's largest gas and electric utilities to develop demonstration financing programs for
solar hot water retrofits. The PUC order required these programs to allow solar retrofit of 2% of
the gas and 10% of the electric water heaters within each utility's service area. The utilities were
also required to offer sufficient funds (in combination with tax credits) to finance the full cost of
all reasonably priced solar systems. The utilities could include the funds advanced in the rate
base or have them treated as expenses. California PUC Decision No. 91272 (Jan. 29, 1980).
The Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. III 1979), provides that whenever
utilities seek to finance solar programs through lenders, the utility must seek the funds from
financial institutions located in the area covered by the program.
107. UTILrrY SOLAR FINANCE, supra note 105, at 19. See also White, Municipal Bond Financing of Solar Energy Facilities, SERI Rep. TR-434-191 (Dec. 1979).
108. 10 C.F.R. § 456.309 (1980).
109. See Noll, %bcUilitiis and Solar EnergP Development-InstitutionalEconomic Considerations,
in ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY 211 (S. Feldman & R. Wirtshafter eds. 1980).

If a joint utility/lender financial program is not practical, it may be possible to establish a
subsidiary solely for the purpose of making renewable energy loans. Capital for such a venture
could come from a conventional lending source. An advantage of forming a subsidiary is that it
can be highly leveraged to obtain lower costs for capital than might be otherwise obtainable.
The revenue would be the source of interest payments on the debt issued to operate the subsidiary. If the project is of sufficiently low risk, the parent company may not be placed in the
position of having to guarantee the debt, thereby not damaging its financial status. UTImrry
SOLAR FINANCE, supra note 105, at 18.
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(iv)

Legal and Regulatory Issues Raised by Active
Involvement in Renewable Energy Development

Should a utility decide that it is economically attractive to market renewable energy devices aggressively, the marketing of such devices is likely
to be postponed until a number of legal and regulatory issues are resolved.
As discussed above, antitrust concerns are the most important of those issues.1 t ° Another potentially significant legal impediment was removed
when the 1980 Energy Security Act eliminated most of NECPA's restrictions
on such utility commercialization activities.III Nevertheless, utilities considering a renewable energy marketing strategy will also want to examine a
number of other relevant federal and state laws. Some of these laws, and
their probable effect on marketing plans, are addressed below.
Federal Tax Laws. Utilities are not granted any special tax credits on
decentralized renewable energy devices purchased for lease or resale to consumers. Utilities investing in either conventional or alternative means of
supplying power are eligible only for the regular ten percent investment tax
credit. This credit applies to investments in tangible property used in cer113
2
tain specified businesses, i one of which is furnishing electrical energy.
Tangible property includes facilities for the conventional generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Capital outlays for decentralized renewable energy devices seem eligible for the tax credit if such devices are
purchased by utilities as a supplementary source of power for customers.
The devices would then be considered an additional means by which utilities
supply the power they are under a duty to provide. However, this tax credit
is available only for investments in property owned by the business claiming
the credit.i 14 Purchase of renewable energy devices for resale to customers
therefore does not qualify for the credit, since the devices then become the
property of the utilities' customers. Only investments in renewable energy
devices which utilities own and then lease to their customers seem to be eligible, since only in this situation are the devices part of the utilities' property
used in their business of supplying power."I 5
Utilities would not qualify for the special ten to fifteen percent energy
tax credit offered other businesses for similar investments. The energy tax
credit is generally available to businesses that purchase certain kinds of renewable energy property for use as supplementary sources of power in their
day-to-day operations.' 1 6 Public utility property, however, does not qualify. 1 7 It is defined in the federal tax statutes as property used predomi110. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
11. See supra notes 80-81.
112. I.R.C. § 48(a)(l)(B).
113. Id.at § 48(a)(1)(B)(i).
114. Kahn, supra note 104, at 549.
115. Id. Kahn questions whether utility investments in utility-owned devices would qualify
for this credit.
116. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 222(C), 94 Stat. 262.
117. I.R.C. § 48(1)(3) (B), as amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-223, § 222(i)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 265.
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nantly in the business of furnishing electrical energy. " 18 Utility property was
excluded from the energy tax credit because Congress believed that
shortages of conventional fuel would force utilities to invest in renewable
energy sources without this additional financial incentive.' 1 9
The Pub/ic Ulity Holding Company Act. If electric utilities market and
finance renewable energy devices they will do so through either regulated or
unregulated subsidiaries. The subsidiaries will be regulated if the local
PUCs regard such commercialization efforts as a proper part of the business
of supplying power, and they will be unregulated if the PUCs consider the
commercialization to be outside the scope of the utilities' monopoly
franchise. 120 Utilities that create either type of subsidiary will be forming
holding company systems. The utilities will be holding companies of the
subsidiaries, and each utility and its subsidiary will be a holding company
system. Consequently, these utilities and their subsidiaries will be subject to
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.121 The Act should not,
however, have any significant impact on those electric utilities that form subsidiaries to market renewable energy devices.
The Act allows utilities within holding company systems to engage in
businesses other than that of supplying power if such other businesses are
reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate to the supplying of power. 122 Commercialization of renewable energy systems is arguably reasonably incidental to the supplying of power because these devices
are an alternative means of providing the energy which utilities have a duty
to supply.' 23 Moreover, section 550 of the Energy Security Act of 1980124
expressly provides that any financing, supply, or installation of residential
energy conservation measures by a public utility holding company system
shall be construed as a business reasonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate to the supplying of power by the utilities within the
holding company system. 125 Thus, utilities engaged in renewable energy
commercialization efforts are exempt from Holding Company Act
restrictions.
State Law Regardng Ut/ity MerchandisingActivities. Because of the high
cost of renewable energy devices, and the uncertainty associated with the
introduction of any new technology, many electric utilities may regard renewable energy commercialization programs as a risky investment. These
utilities may require that they be allowed to treat the costs of these activities
118. I.R.C. § 46(0(5) (1976).
119. S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1978).
120. Feldman & Wirtshafter, Policy The Impact of Utitp Rates, Solar Tax Credits to Consumers,
and Utility Financing of Solar Energy Systems, in ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY: THE
PUBLIC-UTILITY INTERFACE 194 (S. Feldman & R. Wirthshafter eds. 1980).

121. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (1976).
123. Telephone conversation with Andrew MacDonald, Special Counsel for the Public Utilities Branch, Corporate Regulation Division, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 17,

1980).
124. Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980).
125. Id. § 550, 94 Stat. 745.
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the same way they handle their costs of providing conventional power, that
is, by passing these costs along to their ratepayers. If utilities are allowed to
recover all of their commercialization costs from their ratepayers, the risk
would be minimized.
In some states utilities may not, however, be permitted to rate-base renewable energy commercialization costs. Several state statutes 26 and a
number of PUC decisions' 27 prohibit utilities from including merchandising
costs in their revenue requirements. In these jurisdictions utilities may not
be able to submit merchandising costs as operating expenses in a ratemaking
proceeding, nor count capital investments in merchandising inventory as
part of the fair value of the property devoted to public use which constitutes
the utilities' rate base. Therefore, utilities subject to these statutes and decisions may not be able to pass their merchandising costs along to their ratepayers, nor may they earn a guaranteed fair rate of return on their
investment in merchandising inventory.
Whether these statutes and decisions apply to renewable energy programs is not clear. These legislative and administrative proscriptions occurred over the past fifty years, and do not specifically address the marketing
and financing of renewable energy devices or any other conservation measures. Instead they deal with the sale and the subsidizing of customer
purchases of domestic electric appliances. If renewable energy devices are
considered electric appliances because they use electricity (albeit only intermittently, for backup power), then these statutes and decisions would seem
to exclude renewable energy commercialization costs from utilities' revenue
requirements. If, however, these devices are considered alternative sources of
energy (because their principal source of power is solar rather than electrical
energy), state legislatures and PUCs may instead regard commercialization
of renewable energy products as a proper part of the business of supplying
power. Utilities would then be able to include their commercialization costs
in their revenue requirements.
.Some state statutes and a few PUC decisions expressly allow utilities to
recover the costs of marketing and financing renewable energy devices from
their ratepayers. For example, one section of the Illinois state code provides
that financing and supplying of solar energy systems are valid services and
126. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.04.270 (1962);

Wis.

STAT. ANN. § 196.59 (West

1957).
127. Ste, e.g., Re Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Co., 55 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 334 (1964)
(Colo.); Re Washington Gas-Light Co., 11 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 119 (1935) (D.C.); Re Miller
Gas Co., No. 770496-GU(CR) (May 10, 1978) (Fla.); Re Gulf Power Co., No. 71341-EV (June
30, 1972) (Fla.); Re Tampa Electric Co., 92 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 398 (1971) (Fla.); Re
Intermountain Gas Co., 86 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 1970 (Idaho); Re Potomac Edison Co., 7
PUB. U. REP. 135 (1935) (Md.); Re Detroit Edison Co., 83 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 463 (1970)
(Mich.); Re Michigan Gas Utils. Co., 47 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 15 (1962) (Mich.); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 113 (1936) (Mo.);
Re Laclede Gas Light Co., 7 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 277 (1934) (Mo.); Re Pennsylvania Gas Co.,
74 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 209 (1968) (N.Y.); Re Brooklyn Borough Gas. Co., 56 PUB. U. REP.
(PUR) 1 (1944) (N.Y.); Re Green Mountain Power Corp., 94 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 417
(1972) (Vt.); Re Menasha, 2-U-1280 Abstract PUR Digest, Vol. 13, 1933-39 Supp. 2122, (Nov.

23, 1938) (Wis).
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purposes of a public energy supplier within its service area. 128 The state
code of Iowa contains a similar provision,' 29 and the Arkansas state code
provides that energy conservation programs, such as those involving residential solar commercialization, are a proper and essential function of public
utilities.' 30 Several recent PUG decisions are in accord with the policy expressed in these statutes. For example, in 1978, the Colorado PUC included
the operating expenses of a solar energy research program in a utility's revenue requirement, and in 1980, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the action.' 3 ' Similarly, in 1973, the Michigan PUC ruled that the costs involved
in an energy conservation financing program were a proper utility
32
expense. 1
State hub/ic Utt'lit Securities Laws. Utilities are likely to finance renewable energy commercialization programs principally through the issuance and
sale of securities, and, therefore, will be subject to state public utility securities laws. These laws typically provide that utilities may issue securities only
with the approval of the local regulatory commissions, and then only under
33
such terms and for such purposes determined to be in the public interest.'
There are two ways in which PUCs administering state public utility securities laws could prevent utilities from issuing securities to finance renewable
energy commercialization programs. One way would be to find that renewable energy investments are not a proper subject for utility securities issues.
The second way would be to limit the numbers of securities and thereby
34
prevent the utility from raising the necessary capital. 1
Nevertheless, PUCs are unlikely to prevent utility financing of renewable energy commercialization programs. Utilities will probably commercialize these devices through unregulated subsidiaries. 135 State public utility
securities laws apply, however, only to securities issued by utilities for the
financing of utility business; they do not apply to securities issued by unregulated subsidiaries for nonutility business. Even renewable energy programs
whose financing would be subject to PUC authority would not be adversely
affected by state securities laws. Utilities that directly commercialize renewable energy devices as part of their utility business would have to obtain
PUC approval. Thus, PUCs are unlikely to deny utilities permission to issue
securities to support PUC-approved activities.
128.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 961/, § 7315 (Smith-Hurd 1979).

129. IOWA CODE ANN. § 93.30 (Supp. 1981).
130. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-2503 (1979).

131. Caldwell v. Public Util. Comm'n, 613 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1980).
132. Re Mich. Consol. Gas Co., I PUB. U.

REP.

(PUR) 4th 229 (1973) (Mich.). Although

the case involved a home insulation program, the language of the decision was broad enough to
encompass an, energy conservation program.
133. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 817 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I1 2/3, § 21
(Smith-Hurd 1966); N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw § 69 (McKinney 1955).
134. PUCs may limit the amount of debt securities which utilities may issue if, for example,
utilities are approaching or have reached the limits of their debt coverage ratios.
135. See FELDMAN & WIRTSHAFTrER, srupra note 120.
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DecentralizedElectricity-ProduczngRenewable Technologies

The impact of nonelectricity-producing renewable technologies on utilities differs from that of the four electricity producing renewable technologies-small wind energy conversion systems (swecs), photovoltaic
applications (pvs), low head hydroelectricity facilities (low head hydro), and
small scale biomass plants. Both utilities and the law treat these technologies
differently from other applications because of their electricity-producing
function. Before analyzing these impacts and the regulatory response to
them, an explanation of the relationship of each technology to utilities is
provided.
SS WECS. Large wind turbines have a rated power output of one to
three megawatts which utilities can use to generate power for sale. Swecs
generally only have a rated power output of one to fifteen kilowatts and are
136
used by residences, commercial establishments, and some light industry.
Like active and passive nonelectricity-producing systems, swecs have been
included in the NECPA residential conservation service program as a renew137
able resource measure that must be included in a utility's energy audit.
Because they produce electricity, however, swecs create unique problems for
utilities.
The first problem is power quality. Power produced by the wind generator must be in perfect synchronization with the utility's supply. The second
problem is poor power factors: the relationship between kilovolt amperes
and kilowatts. Customers with low power factors concern utilities because
billing practices may not recover the total cost of service, and these customers also increase system energy losses. Swecs typically have poor power factors, especially at the low output levels where the machines will most
frequently operate. A third problem is that wind generators feeding power
into utility lines could be very dangerous to linemen. Finally, swecs are only
intermittent producers of electricity, so owners must rely on conventional
utility backup power.133
* PVs. Like swecs, photovoltaic systems produce electricity intermittently, thus precluding complete independence. PV electric output is somewhat more predictable than swecs power, but it is generally limited to
daytime hours. PV flat-plate collectors have a capacity factor, which is the
ratio between actual energy output to output at rated capacity, of approximately twenty percent. Photovoltaic systems have a relatively low capacity
factor because of the lack of output at night and the fact that the plate

136. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP ON WIND ENERGY, held in Washington, D.C. October 29-31, 1979

(June 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS: PROGRAM SUMMARY (Dec.
1978); ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., Going with the Wid, March 1980, at 6.
137. DOE Residential Energy Conservation Program, 10 C.F.R. § 456.105 (v)(5) (1981).
138. See Requirements Assessment of Wind Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI
Rep. ER-978-SY (Jan. 1979).
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3 9
PV systems are espedirectly faces the sun for a small portion of the day.'
cially useful to a utility in regions where the load curve is highest near the
insolation peak, because the PVs supply the greatest power when needed
most. PVs have another advantage over swecs, in that they never produce
excess power during a valley in a utility's nighttime load curve since they do
40
not generate power at night.'

* Low HeadHydro. Small hydroelectric facilities are those that have not
4
more than fifteen megawatts of installed capacity.' ' Important differences
distinguish hydro facilities from swecs and PVs. Barring a drought, a small
hydro plant can produce electricity steadily. Because the generating capacity is considerably larger for low head hydro facilities, they also are more
likely to be developed by utilities or rural cooperatives. Small hydro plants
may also be owned and operated by private parties and private developers
seeking to sell the power for a profit. While no law forbids this entrepreneurship, private developers must realize that any project with over one hundred
kilowatts of installed capacity risks being subject to licensing by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the sale of power may be regulated by a state PUC or by FERC. Several individuals or industries may
join in the cooperative development of a watercourse. Such joint operation
may again subject the developers to the jurisdiction of the state
of a system
PUG.' 42
* Small Scale Biomass. Unlike the other three technologies, this method
produces electricity by direct combustion of biomass or by the combustion of
biomass-produced gas to turn a turbine. An internal use system might be a
self-sufficient, relatively steady producer of power, but it could be subject to
shortages of biomass materials and, thus, need the services of a utility.
A biomass conversion facility that sells gas to an interstate pipeline system or supplies power to an electric power grid would be subject to regulation by FERC. If the sale of biomass-derived electricity results in interstate
distribution through a power grid, the facility would also be subject to
FERC jurisidiction. An intrastate operation may be subject to regulation by
43
the state PUC, depending upon the state definition of a public utility.'
t 44
a
Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
regulafederal
state
and
from
exempted
may
be
facility
biomass conversion

139. Seegenera/ly Requirements Assessment of Photovoltaic Power Plants in Electric Utility
Systems, EPRI Rep. ER-685-SY (June 1978).
140. See general/( Lamm, Photovoltaic Commercialization: An Analysis of Legal Issues Af-

fecting a Government-Accelerated Solar Industry, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-423 (June 1980).
141. This definition has been adopted by DOE in its small hydroelectric program, and in
section 408 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2708 (Supp. IV
1980).

142. See McGuigan, Legal Issues Affecting the Development of Low-Head Hydroelectric
Power, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-373 (June 1980).
143. See C. Schwab, Legal Considerations in the Development and Implementation of Biomass Energy Technologies, SERI Rep. No. TR-62-624 (Sept. 1979).
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796, 824i (Supp. III 1979).
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tion if it qualifies as a cogeneration facility. 145
1.

Impacts On and Interconnections With the Utility

These decentralized electricity-producing technologies might have three
different impacts on utilities. First, it may be possible for some low head
hydro and small biomass projects to make themselves independent of the
utility. Such independence could occur either with sufficient fuel (water and
biomass) or adequate storage. Even biomass facilities, however, must contemplate forced outages and planned shutdowns for periodic maintenance.
Energy storage for hydro plants is expensive and not very efficient. Thus,
both technologies need to be connected in some fashion to the utility.
Interconnection, in turn, produces two important impacts: the need of
the owners of these technologies to purchase backup power periodically from
utilities, and the desire of the owners to sell electricity to utilities whenever
the rate of production exceeds that of consumption. Issues arising from these
impacts include whether a utility can refuse either to sell backup power to,
or to purchase excess power from, electricity-producing renewable energy
technologies. If a utility cannot make such refusals, then what rates may
utilities charge for backup service to the customer, and what rates may utili46
ties charge for buying back excess power?'
2.

Legal and Regulatory Issues Governing Interconnection

The relationship between utilities and independent, relatively small
producers of electricity was not, for the most part, subject to scrutiny by any
federal or state regulatory authority. The only regulation involved energy
sales by small power producers to electric utilities; the regulatory inquiry was
on the effect of the purchase on the revenue requirement of the purchasing
utility. Even then, the extent and effect of these transactions were
47
insignificant. 1
With rapidly escalating costs of fossil fuel and utility plant capacity,
and with the development of electric energy from decentralized electricityproducing renewable energy technologies, this previously neglected relation145. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. IV 1980); see 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1976) (regarding FERC
jurisdiction).
146. The arguments surrounding backup rates for electricity-producing renewable energy
technologies are similar to those raised when discussing rates for backup power for nonelectric
applications. The source of energy is intermittent, and the utility may be asked to provide firm
power to the electricity-producing customer during the times when the device is not providing
enough energy. The utility may argue that it has to maintain enough generation, transmission,
and distribution facilities to serve that customer whenever needed, so the customer should pay
those fixed costs regardless of how much electricity is used in a given month. Utilities may press
this argument more strongly for electricity-producing customers than for nonelectric customers
because utilities are generally standing by for a larger load when dealing with the former.
Therefore, it is common for utilities to propose a standby charge or a higher customer charge
and/or demand charge to provide the opportunity for a more complete recovery of the utility's
fixed costs. Seegeneraly Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., Economic Research Div., Electric Utilities
and Solar Energy 63-64 (April 1980); Rice, An Analysis of PURPA and Solar Energy 65-67,
SERI Rept. No. TR-434-484 (March, 1980).
147. P. BROWN, STATE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES AND THE PROBLEM OF MARKETING
POWER GENERATED BY SMALL POWER PRODUCERS 2-3 (Energy Law Institute (1980)).
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ship came under increased public attention. It prompted the issuance of
federal and state legislation and regulations that define the relationship.
The key statute is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA). 148
a.

PURPA-Interconnection

and Rate Regulation

Title II of PURPA sets out rules governing the interconnection of utilities with independently owned facilities for cogeneration or electric power
production from renewable energy sources. A qualifying small power producer is defined as a person, not engaged in the electric business, who generates electricity by use of a renewable energy resource from a facility of eighty
megawatts or less. 149 The four types of facilities discussed above qualify.
Section 202 of PURPA allows FERC to require interconnection between
these small power producers and utilities. 1 50 This section is significant because, by requiring utilities to connect physically their facilities with qualifying facilities, it effectively prevents utilities from refusing to buy power from
or sell power to electricity-producing renewable energy applications.
Interconnection creates two important impacts on utilities: the need of
the small power producers for utility backup power and the desire of these
producers to sell excess electricity back to the utilities. FERC regulation,
through its PURPA authority, can require the interconnection. The pricing
for backup energy will then be based on factors similar to those for nonelectric renewable energy applications. The intermittent nature of the application similarly will affect the utility's standby capacity cost.
The issue which sets electricity-producing customers apart from nonelectric customers is the buyback issue. If a utility buys excess electricity, the
rate must be determined. Several approaches have been proposed. One
method is to let the meter run both ways and charge or pay the customer the
net balance (purchases minus sales). The utility buys at its retail rate for
purchases from the customers. Another approach is to measure separately
the energy from the customer with a time-of-day meter and to pay the utility's time-differentiated marginal cost, including demand and energy costs.
Yet another approach is to pay a rate which reflects only the utility's cost of
fuel, either the incremental cost or the average cost as reflected in the fuel
adjustment charge. Finally, the rate could equal the utility's full "avoided"
costs, the incremental costs of electricity energy, capacity, or both which the
utility would have had to generate or purchase but for the purchase from the
15
customer. 1
Section 210 of PURPA requires electric utilities operating in the proximate area of a qualifying cogeneration or renewable energy electric facility
to purchase all or a part of the output offered by the qualifying facility own148. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
(Supp. III 1979)). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126
(1982).
149. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611, 2621, 2622 (Supp. III 1979).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. IV 1980).
151. Ste Rice, supra note 146.
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er, and to sell backup power to the owner at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates.1 52 The purchasing utility is not required to pay more
than the incremental cost of producing the same power from some alternative source.15 3 In other words, "reasonableness" is defined by the concept of
the utility's "avoided cost."
FERC regulations establishing rate standards between utilities and
qualifying small power producers' 54 became effective on March 20, 1980.
PURPA provides that rate setting will be accomplished by state regulatory
authorities pursuant to these standards. 155 State authorities must set three
different types of rates.156 First, rates for purchases for recently constructed
qualifying facilities must be set to equal the avoided cost of energy or capacity costs of the electric utility.157 Second, rates for sales of backup, mainte-

nance, supplementary, and interruptible power for qualifying facilities must
be set which are reasonable and nondiscriminatory.' 5 8 Third, state authorities must assess the interconnection costs which a qualifying facility must
pay to the utility.'
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The most novel and significant of these ratemaking requirements is the
establishment of purchase rates based on avoided costs. While the principles
of avoided cost determination are relatively well understood, the mechanisms of actually determining these costs are difficult and may be new to
many state regulatory bodies. One particularly relevant issue is whether a
given cost is actually avoidable; if so, measurement for purposes of ratemaking will be extremely difficult.16o
Electricity-producing renewable energy technologies require a determi152. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b), 824a-3(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
153. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. III 1979). "Incremental cost of alternative electric energy" is defined as "the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the
purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or
purchase from another source." 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d) (Supp. III 1979).
154. FERC has the authority to exempt certain small producers (those whose installed capacity is 30 megawatts or less) from public utility regulation at the federal and state level if it
determines such exemption is necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. III 1979).
155. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(o) (Supp. III 1979). The constitutionality of this provision of
PURPA was successfully challenged by the state of Mississippi, on the lower court level. In an
unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
declared that PURPA unconstitutionally infringed upon Mississippi's ratemaking authority
over intrastate sales by public utilities within Mississippi. The court found that PURPA was
beyond the scope of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and an invasion of state
sovereignty in violation of the tenth amendment. Mississippi v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, No. J79-0212(c) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). However, the
United States Supreme Court held that the challenged provisions did not violate the commerce
clause nor the tenth amendment, finding the challenged provisions constitutional. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
156. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304-306 (1981). Several of these FERC regulations were successfully
challenged in American Electric Power Service Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
157. Id..§ 292.304.
158. Id. § 292.305.
159. Id. § 292.306.
160. For example, a utility may have already incurred significant plant costs before construction commences. Other plant costs may vary with the rate of construction. The range of
such costs which may be avoided based upon certain contingencies is neither discrete nor continuous. Each contingency must be evaluated in the context of its probability of occurrence and

its impact on the utility. Id. § 292.304(e).
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nation of avoided utility costs when they offer energy of sufficient reliability
and legally enforceable guarantees of delivery, to permit the purchasing utility to avoid constructing a new generating unit or reducing firm power
purchases from another utility. But how can electricity-producing technologies, which are largely unpredictable energy sources, meet this criterion?
One possible solution is that several facilities on the same utility system
could aggregate their capacity values to achieve reliability. For a power
source that is coincident with the system peaks, a solution may be to give
some capacity value to swecs or PVs. Further, it may be that the fluctuations of wind, insolation, hydro, and biomass patterns in a large area tend to
16 1
even out, and provide some constant level of energy.
b.

State Initzatives after PURPA

The FERC ratesetting guidelines for state regulatory authorities are not
methodological; considerable discretion is given to the states. For example, a
state regulatory authority may require a regulated utility to purchase power
from a small power producer at more than the avoided cost of the utility.
Obviously, any such order would involve a subsidy to the small power producer, usually at the expense of the other ratepayers. Nevertheless, since the
FERC regulations do not prohibit such rates,1 62 some states might wish to
design a purchase rate that subsidizes alternative energy development.
III.

LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH UTILITIES AND CENTRALIZED
RENEWABLE ENERGY APPLICATIONS

Unlike decentralized applications, which mainly affect the amount of
power that a utility must normally produce, centralized renewable energy
technologies produce a source of electrical power which utilities may then
sell to their customers. Some advantages to utilities in using centralized
technologies to produce electricity are of course that the fuel source is either
inexhaustible or renewable, and is relatively clean. For utilities accustomed
to relying on scarce oil and gas, environmentally damaging coal, or potentially dangerous uranium, renewable fuels may be an attractive option.
Six kinds of centralized technologies may be used. Biomass resources
can be used to generate electricity either by direct combustion or by being
converted to densified solid or liquid fuels for standard turbine-generators.
Hydroelectric power is already a developed technology which can be further
utilized by increasing the number of low-head hydroelectric dams. Large
wind energy conversion systems (WECS) can be used in an array to generate
electricity. Solar thermal central receiver plants can produce electricity by
having sunlight reflected by mirrors (heliostats) to heat a fluid in a central
receiver, which is then used to drive a turbine-generator. Photovoltaic cells
(PVs) may be grouped together in a system of flat plates or concentrating
configurations to produce electricity. Ocean thermal energy conversion
(OTEC) systems use ocean temperature differences between warm surface
161.
162.

Se 45 Fed. Reg. 12,224 (1980).
See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (1981).
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waters and cold water depths to operate a heat cycle to generate
63
electricity.'
Whether utilities will consider these technologies viable alternatives will
depend on a number of factors. The extent to which each technology is
ready to generate reliable power will obviously affect utility interest in that
technology. An OTEC facility, for example, is less likely to be the subject of
utility interest than a hydroelectric facility because of the utility's familiarity
with hydroelectric power. Biomass and hydroelectric power will require local, guaranteed supplies of plant and water resources at competitive prices.
All six of the central electric technologies will depend upon a favorable comparative cost for generated power.
Apart from the price and level of technological development, legal and
institutional factors will also determine the extent to which utilities become
interested in centralized systems. Four such factors are likely to play a role
in the utilities' decisional calculus; 1) federal law mandating consideration of
centralized technologies; 2) competition between utilities using centralized
technologies and conventionally fueled utilties; 3) siting of utilities using renewable energy technologies; and 4) regulations relevant to the operation of
such a utility.

A.

FederalLaw Mandating Utility Considerationof Centrahzed Technologies

The most direct way of obtaining utility use of centralized technologies
is to order them either to retrofit or to construct generating facilities to use
renewable fuels. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978
(FUA) 164 was a step in this direction. This statute prohibits the use of natural gas or petroleum as a primary energy source in certain new electric
powerplants, and orders, subject to certain exemptions, new electric powerplants to be constructed with the capability to use coal "or any other alternate fuel" as a primary fuel source. 165 The statute also allows the
Department of Energy to prohibit the use of petroleum or natural gas as a
primary fuel source in any existing electric powerplant if it determines that
the power plant has the technical capability to use coal or "another alternate
fuel" as a primary energy source. 166 The term "alternate fuel" is defined to
include "biomass, and municipal, industrial, or agricultural wastes, wood,
1
and renewable and geothermal energy sources." 67
Although this statute places primary emphasis upon coal as a substitute
fuel for oil and gas, and although its many exemptions appear far more sig163. See generally Nanda, Ocean Thermal Energy Converszon (OTEC) Development Under US and
8 DEN. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 239 (1979); R. Taylor, Solar Thermal
InternationalLaw and Institutions,

Repowering Utility Value Analysis, SERI Rep. No. TR-8016-1 (Dec. 1979); U.S. Dep't of Energy, Fourth Wind Energy Workshop 137-144, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1979); Requirements
Assessment of Wind Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI Rep. ER-978-SY (Jan.
1979); Field Program Management for Central Receiver Technology Development (June 1978);
Requirements Assessment of Photovoltaic Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI Rep.
ER-685-SY (June 1978).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. III 1979).
165. Id.§ 8311.
166. Id.§ 8341.
167. Id.§ 8302(a)(6); see also 10 C.F.R. §§ 503-07 (1980).
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nificant than its prohibitions, its provisions do recognize centralized renewable energy applications as alternatives that must at least be considered by
electric utilities. Of these applications, FUA assumes that biomass has the
most near-term potential. FUA could therefore accelerate utilities' use of
biomass as a fuel source.t68
B.

Competition of FacilitiesUsing Renewable Energy Technologies with
Conventionally-FueledUtilities

Two types of facilities use renewable energy technologies to generate
electricity. First, a large (50-100 megawatts) facility may-generate electricity
using any of the six centralized renewable energy technologies. This type
would typically be privately-owned, and its customers could include the entire spectrum of traditional electric utility customers. The second kind,
much smaller (2-10 megawatts), is usually owned by its customers, and uses
only certain centralized renewable energy technologies-biomass, low-head
hydro, WECS, and PVs. This second type is used to produce electricity for a
small class of customers, such as apartment buildings, condominiums, shopping centers, industrial parks, or any similar activity where multiple users
could utilize a single system. If either type of facility is located within a
utility's service area, it would compete with the utility. The response of the
utilities and their regulators to the competitive interaction will affect the
future of these facilities.
1. Utility Responses
Established utilities might have a tolerant attitude if these facilities do
not adversely affect utility operations. A permissive attitude might exist if
the facilities alleviate capital requirements for utility expansion. This situation might exist with a summer peaking utility if a facility using renewable
technologies tends to reduce the utility's seasonal peak demand. A utility
might also favor such facilities if it is confronted by a steadily increasing
demand for power, but, because of difficulties in securing authorization from
regulatory authorities, it is unable to provide increased generation capacity.
A negative attitude might exist when the utility is left with excess capacity which could not be economically deployed or, in the case of smaller
multi-user renewable energy systems, when capacity must be expanded to
meet backup demand. The utility might be required to increase capacity
because, for example, the multi-user's need for backup service coincides with
seasonal peak demand periods. Under these circumstances, the utility will
face decreased revenues without any corresponding cost benefit.169
168. R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 197-202; Spurr, Silviculture, 240 Sci. AM.
76 (1979).
169. The economic burden occasioned could be borne by utility customers that did not use
the renewable energy facility, but this result would have to be achieved through a rate increase

necessitating a change in the rate structure. Allocating the burden to the customer not using
renewable energy would effectively subsidize users of renewable energy. The utility may be
hesitant in seeking to use the rate structure to accomplish this form of subsidization because of
customer hostility to rate increases; a PUC may be reluctant to permit this subsidization out of
a sense of equity. See Competitie Aspecls of Ultfiy Parttpaoin,supra note 19, at 242-43.
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2.

PUC Responses

Public utilities generally are spared from competition. This regulatory
protection occurs from a franchise granting the utility the right to provide
service on a nearly exclusive basis within a designated area. 170 Three legal
issues are likely to surface should a new, privately-owned facility begin competing with a franchised utility, especially if the facility uses central renewable energy technologies capable of generating over fifty megawatts to a large
service area. They are 1) whether the facility is subject to PUC jurisdiction,
of PUC jurisdiction, and 3) the possible alternatives to
2) the consequences
17
PUC jurisdiction. '
a. PUCJurisdictionOver Facilities Using Renewable Energy
Most state constitutions and statutes recognize the broad authority of
72
PUC's to regulate the facilities, services, and rates of ahy public utility.'
Suppliers of electrical energy, including cooperative electric associations or
nonprofit electric corporations, are usually classified as public utilities subject to PUC jurisdiction. Under these principles, a facility using renewable
energy that desired to supply electric energy to the public or to members of
an association formed by the company would be subject to PUC jurisdiction.
Most courts hold that public utility status is accorded to a company if it
has "dedicated its property to public use." In Munn v. Illinois, 173 the United
States Supreme Court established the principle that when one devotes property to a use which affects the community at large, regulation can follow.
The owner then faces the prospect of having the property and its operations
controlled for the common good. Any organization that holds itself out as
serving some of the public's power needs through solar technologies may
thus be considered a utility.
Activities not involving the dedication of property to public use may,
nonetheless, be "so affected with the public interest" as to give rise to PUC
jurisdiction. This is a minority position that was applied in CottonwoodMall
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co. ,174 where a shopping center
constructed an electric generating plant designed to supply power to its tenants. The court held that since both the shopping center tenants and the
public at large would benefit from the supply of power, the activity conferred public utility status upon the shopping center and subjected it to PUC
regulation. Under either the majority or minority rule, a private facility desiring to generate electricity for public distribution would certainly qualify
as a public utility.
FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 83, at 62.
171. An excellent discussion of these issues appears in Dean & Miller, Utilities at the Dawn ofa

170. M.

Solar Age, 53 N.D. L. REv. 329, 345-350 (1977).
172. See, e.g., Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 134, 414
P.2d 911, 914 (1966); CoLo. CONST., art. XXV; CoLO. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(2) (1973).
173. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
174. 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971).
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Consequences of PUCJurisdiction

A facility using renewable energy should fear PUC jurisdiction for several reasons. Under regulation it must file reports and accounts, serve all
customers who demand service within a given area, submit its rate schedules
to the PUC for approval, and provide safe, adequate, and reliable service
until given permission to discontinue. 175 Perhaps the most significant burden of PUC jurisdiction is the requirement of obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity before beginning operation or even
construction. Certification proceedings are often long and expensive. Furthermore, PUCs use the process to protect existing utility monopolies, which
76
are granted unless the public convenience and necessity require otherwise. '
Generally, the only way a facility using renewable energy can convince
a PUC that the public convenience and necessity require its certification is to
show that existing utilities are unwilling or unable to provide adequate electric service. Lack of facilities, economic infeasibility, or fuel shortages might
constitute the basis of inadequate service. However, some courts have held
that the utility first certified should be given the opportunity to supply any
needed service before another utility is allowed to compete with it. 17 7 Other
courts have held that even if the existing utility is providing inadequate and
inefficient service, it will still be permitted to exercise monopoly control if it
promises to correct its shortcomings. 178 Another"method a renewable energy
facility can use to gain entry into the electric service market is to purchase an
existing utility's certificate of public convenience and necessity, subject to
79
PUC approval.'
c.

Alternatives to PUcJurisdct'on

These barriers to electric service competition may be removed by several means. PUCs might choose not to exercise jurisdiction over electric generating facilities using renewable fuels. Such a policy could be beneficial to
renewable energy development, but should be confined to certification procedures. Otherwise, consumers would not be accorded the protection that
rate and service regulations provide. Of course, if a PUC decided not to
exercise jurisdiction, utilities threatened by competition would surely argue
that the PUC is compelled to exercise jurisdiction over any entity declared as
a matter of law to be affected with a public interest.
If this argument prevails, the statutes could be amended either to re175. Dean & Miller, supra note 171, at 348.
176.

P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILTY EcONOMIcs 29 (1964).

177. See Town of Fountain v. Public Util. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527 (1968);
Public Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d 543 (1960).
178. See Kentucky Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
179. The ability of a renewable energy facility to purchase a certificate from an existing
utility rests (as it does when allegations are made that the existing utility's service is inadequate)
in the discretion of the PUC. This discretion would obviously be substantially limited by the
bargaining position of the existing utility. The authority of the PUC to exercise discretion
relating to the sale of a certificate does not give the PUC the power to order the sale, for to do so
might constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Se Public Util. Comm'n v.
Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 85, 428 P.2d 928, 935 (1967); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-5105 (1973).
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move the certification requirement or to exempt renewable energy facilities
from PUC jurisdiction. 1 0 Recent federal legislation has also removed some
of the present discretion from state PUCs. PURPA permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to prescribe rules relating to the exemption of
"qualifying cogeneration facilities" from state laws and regulation respecting
wholesale sales of electricity.181 Cogeneration is defined as a "facility which
produces (i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful energy (such as
heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes."' 8 2 This definition is broad enough to exempt many multi-user renewable energy facilities from PUC jurisdiction.
3.

Competition by Municipally-Owned Renewable Energy Facilities

Utilities owned by municipalities have broad potential to experiment
with, develop, and operate facilities using renewable fuels since they are not
subject to PUC jurisdiction. Recognizing this potential, some state legislatures have granted municipalities the power to acquire or erect electricityproducing renewable energy systems. 1 83 In the absence of statutory authority, common law and constitutional provisions govern whether a municipality seeking to compete with an existing utility could ignore a previously
issued franchise. A municipality wishing to compete with an existing utility
would be subject to scrutiny under the contract clause and the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. The contract clause guarantees that no
state shall impair the obligations of contract and the fourteenth amendment
protects against a state taking private property without due process of
law. 184
A municipal franchise to an existing utility is recognized as a binding
contract. Arguably, the municipality has contracted to give the utility the
exclusive right to provide service, and impairment of the agreement would
be actionable under the contract clause. 185 The grant of a franchise, however, has been held to carry with it no implied contract that would foreclose
competition by the municipality. 1 6 In addition, a franchise granted to a
utility by a municipality must be construed in accordance with the municipality's authority to exercise its police power.' 8 7 Establishing a municipallyowned renewable energy facility would presumably promote the health,
180. Once competition isallowed, electric consumers could not be compelled to take service
from one utility, but rather would be able to select service from the utility of their own choice.
See, e.g., Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 278, 128 S.E.2d 405
(1962); Cass County Elec. Coop. v. Otter Tail Power Co., 93 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1958); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 2801-2816 (West Supp. 1981).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. III 1979).
182. Id. § 796(18)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
183. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12825, 11561 (West 1951 & Supp. 1981); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 31-15-707 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
186. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1929); Madera Water Works v. City
of Madera, 228 U.S. 454, 456 (1913); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1

(1898).
187. See Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 363 (1902).
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safety, and welfare of the public, and thus be considered a valid exercise of
police power.
A utility would have a stronger case against competition from a municipally-owned renewable energy facility if the express terms of the franchise
preclude the municipality from operating a competitive facility. Even then,
if electric service from renewable sources is considered to be a "new" utility
service, an exclusive franchise would not protect the holder from competition. Moreover, if the power of a municipality to operate a utility is granted
by the state constitution, the municipality would still be allowed to compete,
because a franchise granted pursuant to state statute cannot abrogate a
power constitutionally vested in a municipality.1 8 The contract clause
should thus pose only a minor limitation on a municipal facility seeking to
compete with a franchised, existing electrical utility.
A private utility may also argue that such municipal involvement in the
franchised area amounts to a "taking" of private property under the fourteenth amendment. This argument is not likely to be successful. In New
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. ,189 the United States Supreme Court
held that when a private utility has been granted a franchise that precludes
competition, the authorization by the municipality of a similar venture does
not constitute a taking when it is an exercise of the police power.
4.

Competition by Federally-Owned Renewable Energy Facilities

Electricity-producing facilities owned by the federal government potentially may compete with private electric utilities. Existing federal power
agencies, such as the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee
Valley Authority, are generating and marketing agencies permitted to enter
into contracts for the wholesale distribution of electric energy. With the exception of the Rural Electrification Administration, the federal power authorities do not generally market electric energy directly to individual
customers on a retail basis. If Congress or federal agencies, however, were to
establish renewable energy electric facilities to compete with privatelyowned utilities at the retail level, these entities would likely be subject to
state PUC jurisdiction. Most state PUC statutes provide that every cooperative electric association and "every other supplier of electricity" are subject
to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the PUC. Courts have held
188. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432 (1929); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
189. 115 U.S. 650 (1885); see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619,
623-24 (1934); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 (1919).
Another possible limitation on municipal competition with existing private utilities is the
array of federal antitrust laws. Municipalities are not likely to be subject to the antitrust laws
after the Supreme Court announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), that the Sherman
Act's coverage does not extend "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id.
at 351. The Parker state action exemption as applied to a municipally-owned utility was more
recently considered in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978),
where the Supreme Court held that actions of municipalities are exempt by the Parker doctrine
when such actions are "engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy ..
" Id. at 413. Any constitutional or statutory authority that a municipality exerts to acquire or operate a facility using renewable energy should
qualify for the state action exemption from the antitrust laws.
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that these statutes make no exceptions. 1 9° Thus, the certification procedures
applicable to privately-owned renewable energy facilities would be equally
applicable to federally-owned facilities.
The tenth amendment also potentially limits the ability of federallyowned solar facilities to compete with existing utilities on a retail basis. It
provides that "[tjhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 19 ' In Fg v. United States, 19 2 the Supreme Court
recognized that this amendment precludes Congress from exercising power
in a manner that impairs a state's integrity or its ability to function effectively. 193 In National League of Cities v. Usey,' 9 4 the Supreme Court recognized that the states have attributes of sovereignty which may not be
impaired by Congress. The Court held that Congress may not exercise the
commerce power so as to limit state decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions. 19 5 States' regulation of public utilities is arguably an integral governmental function traditionally of a local nature.
Thus, a congressionally authorized renewable energy facility may so inter196
fere with the states' regulation as to violate the tenth amendment.
C.

Sithng of Utilities Using Renewable Energy Technologies

If utilities are to construct or to retrofit powerplants that use centralized
renewable energy technologies, one of the first issues that must be addressed
is where they should be located. 197 This issue of site selection has a number
of significant subsidiary questions. For example, any such utility would
want to construct its site where the renewable resource was available and
cost competitive. The utility would also need to assess the location of adequate sites relative to existing transmission lines. If a site was remote from
the existing network, the additional transmission lines needed would raise
the cost of power. In addition, the utility would need to research the land
requirements of the renewable energy technology.
Apart from these economic and geographic considerations, the utility
must also consider the legal implications of selecting a particular site; these
include land use restrictions, environmental concerns, legal liability for tortious interference with private property rights, safety issues, and aesthetics.
190. 'See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 280, 411 P.2d
785, 794-95, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22 (1966); see also E. BERLIN, C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN,
PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 157-63 (1974) (App. C).
191. U.S. CONST., amend. X.

192. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
193. Id. at 547 n.7.
194. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
195. Id. at 855.

196. See Mississippi v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, No. J79-0212(C) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19,
1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
197. See R. KEENEY, SITING ENERGY FACILrIES (1980); Kapaloski, Power Plait Siting on
Pultic Lands. A Proposalfor Resolinng the Enwinmental-Deelopmental Confils, 56 DEN. L.J. 179
(1979).
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The legal concerns differ with each technology and thus, the six primary
technologies will be discussed separately.
1.

Biomass

There are three aspects of a biomass-fueled utility that come into play
in a utility siting decision: collection of biomass, its storage, and resulting
emissions. Wood is the most readily available source of biomass. In fuel
collection, land use is the main problem for large-scale wood-burning power
plants. The harvesting of large quantities of wood (500,000 tons per year for
a fifty megawatt plant) obviously has environmental consequences, and the
size of the operation requires many square miles of forested land (either federally or privately owned). Because of its bulk, wood is not economical to
transport long distances, and therefore, the plant must be sited close to the
trees, and in an area where harvesting is permitted.
Wood also requires large storage areas for its wastes. The runoff waters
from such a storage area can become polluted, and may, therefore, require a
state or federal water discharge permit. The storage area itself may violate
local aesthetic zoning ordinances. 198
The major air pollutant from a wood burning plant is particulate matter. Wood is lower in sulfur than oil and vastly lower in sulfur than coal.
Thus, sulfur pollutants are only a problem in areas that already have fairly
severe sulfur pollution levels. 199 The particulate pollution level can be reduced ninety-nine percent with existing control equipment, and national
source performance standards for particulates can thereby be met. 20 0 A utility using wood as its primary fuel has a distinct emission advantage over
utilities which rely on coal or oil.
2.

Low-Head Hydroelectric Power

There are three legal obstacles facing those wishing to site a low-head
hydroelectric power facility: acquisition of the necessary property rights, obtaining a FERC license, and compliance with relevant state land use laws.
The first step is acquisition of certain property rights. These include 1) the
right to use the land upon which dams, powerhouses, and other facilities will
be located; 2) the right to divert water and use its flow for power; 3) the right
to construct powerlines for distribution or interconnection with an existing
power grid; and 4) the right of access to the dam site. One who constructs a
new dam should also have a legal interest in the land that will be flooded.
Every utility that wishes to rely in whole or in part on low-head hydroe198. Se, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 248(b)(4) (Supp. 1981), which forbids issuance to a
utility of a "certificate of public good" if the state Public Service Board determines that the
project will have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics.
199.

C. HEWETT & C. HIGH, ENVIRONMENTAL ASPEcTS OF WOOD ENERGY CONVERSION

(1979).
200. 40 C.F.R. § 60.42(a)(1) (1981). Coal fired utilities might also wish to burn municipal
solid waste with coal to reduce sulfur emissions from the coal plant. If a plant uses less than 25%
fossil fuel, the plant is exempt from the percentage reduction requirements of federal air pollution regulations. Refuse-derived fuels are exempt from the sulfur standards. &ee id. at § 60.1-

60.424.
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lectric power must also comply with federal laws, the most important of
which is a license from FERC. Federal statutes give FERC the power to
license all dams "necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of
power." 20 1 This authority has been construed to grant FERC jurisdiction
over relatively small hydroelectric facilities that are not on navigable waterways.20 2 Whenever FERC receives a license application, it is required to
consider whether it would be in the public interest to have the project developed. While FERC is required to determine whether the project complies
with state law, such compliance is not a prerequisite for licensing. However,
since the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)20 3 requires an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of human environment, ' 20 4 small hydroelectric
projects may require an EIS if FERC determines that a project has a substantial environmental impact.
Another significant federal statute affecting small hydro development is
PURPA, which provides that FERC establish simple and expeditious licensing procedures for small hydro projects at existing dams. 205 Under PURPA,
dams over 1.5 megawatts will require an EIS, and presentation of evidence
to FERC regarding the project lands and works, methods of financing, and
market for the power. This procedure may delay and deter potential utilities
interested in using low-head hydro.
Such utilities must also comply with applicable state laws. Many states
require permits for all dam construction on waterways within the state. Like
the FERC licensing process, the state permitting process may require consideration of or compliance with certain environmental protection statutes (for
example, laws protecting critical wildlife areas, soil conservation and flood
control regulations, and water quality acts). Many states are also enacting
detailed power plant siting laws which override local regulations affecting
the siting decision. These may be applicable to hydroelectric facilities if the
generating capacity of the hydro project meets the statute's threshold
20 6
requirements.
3.

Large Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS)

WECS will generate maximum electricity if they are arrayed as a group
of large wind machines. 20 7 These WECS farms will require land that has
sufficient average wind velocities and space to allow for the construction and
unobstructed operation of the WECS. The western rangelands are thus
among the most desirable WECS siting locations in the United States.
The federal government holds title to over forty-five percent of that
201. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1976).
202. Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1965).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
204. Id. § 4332.

205. &e 16 U.S.C. § 2705 (Supp. III 1979).
206. Seegrnrally McGuigan, supra note 142, at 30-33.
207. See Worl's Largest Wind Cluster Planned by W:idfrmu, JVE, Caiforna, 7 SO.AR ENERGY INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 15 at 132 (April 13, 1981).
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land area. Congress has spelled out guidelines for federal land utilization in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). 20 8 This
Act specifies that a grant of a right-of-way for generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy is an appropriate use of federal lands. WECS
arrays, after receiving a required environmental assessment by the Department of Interior, therefore should not have trouble obtaining federal rightsof-way for the WECS themselves or for the required transmission lines.
Forest Service land is also governed by FLPMA, as well as by the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,209 the National Forest Management Act of 1976,2 10 and the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978.211
These statutes expand upon the multiple use and sustained yield philosophy,
and require the development of implementation plans for renewable resources on Forest Service land. In developing land use plans to implement
these statutory policies, potential wind power sites may be considered a "resource." Wind, a renewable resource, could therefore be subject to the statutes' sustained yield provisions, and WECS could be considered one of the
multiple uses possible on Forest Service lands.
Other major siting questions for WECS arrays involve the possibility of
noise, interference with television transmission, and the need for Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) acceptance of the WECS towers. 21 2 Noise
problems from wind turbines tend to be site-specific, and can be eliminated
by locating the equipment at a distance from population centers. Largescale WECS should cause little television interference if they, too, are located
in areas of very low population density. The interference produced by the
blades can affect reception only within a few miles of the WECS installation.
If an array is to be located near an FAA navigational aid, it must be below a
line passing through the navigational aid at two degrees from horizontal. A
350 foot tall 2.5 megawatt WECS could be as close as two miles to a naviga213
tional aid.
4.

Photovoltaic Systems and Solar Thermal Central Power Stations

Photovoltaic arrays and solar thermal central power facilities both require an abundant supply of unobstructed sunlight. Therefore, the major
siting concern for these two central technologies is guaranteed solar access.

Courts have not been willing to imply a common law right to light. 21 4 Absent a private agreement or solar zoning statute, a utility's right to direct
sunlight will depend on securing enough open land to insure a lack of obstructions. 21 5 While enactment of state solar access legislation will help to
208. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
209. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
211. 16 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. III 1979).
212. See generallv Noun, Lotker, Friesema, Utility Siting of WECS: A Preliminary Legal/Regulatory Assessment, SERI Rep. No. TR-744-78 (May, 1981).
213. Hoffman, Site Selection Considerations for Land-Based Biomass and Wind Energy
Conversion Systems (WECS) from a Legal Viewpoint, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-372 (July, 1980).
214. G. HAYES, A. MILLER, & G. THOMSON, SOLAR AccESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF
THE LAW 12 (1977); G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAw 53-71 (1979).
215. See Ziliman & Deeney, Legal Aspects of Solar Energ Development, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J.25.
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protect utilities that rely on sunlight as a fuel source, it is important that
such legislation include photovoltaic systems and solar thermal central
2 16
power stations in their definitions of solar uses.
5.

Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)

The most important OTEC siting question is which government controls the siting decision. Since OTEC facilities are offshore, they may be
under the jurisdiction of international law (for example, the Law of the Sea,
the Law of the Continental Shelf, etc.), United States law, or state law. This
issue is partially resolved if the OTEC plant is within twelve miles of the
shoreline; the jurisdiction is then determined by the demarcation of authority between the federal government and adjacent coastal states. 21 7 Because
219
21 8
and the Deepwater Ports Act
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
apply the law of the adjacent coastal state, it seems likely that the law of the
state where the OTEC transmission cables go ashore will apply, to the extent
that it is not inconsistent with other federal law.
D. Legal LiabilitiesResultig From The Operation Of Usng Renewable Fuels
Once the utility is functioning, the two most significant legal concerns
are liability for damage or injury caused by the renewable energy technology, and liability for failure to supply power.
1.

Liability For Damage or Injury

Utilities using WECS or low-head hydroelectric facilities are particularly susceptible to tort liability. Property damage and personal injury could
result from a blade being thrown, the collapse of a supporting tower or a
WECS continuing to feed electricity into the grid during a time when power
from a connecting utility was shut down to allow for repairs. A low-head
hydro plant carries the risk of dam failure, and of injuries caused by the
subsequent flooding.
For utilities using WECS, this potential liability may be resolved by
technological improvements in the wind turbine system. For example, if the
synchronous inverter used to connect WECS to the utility grid automatically
disconnects during power outages, a line worker would be protected from
electrocution. Nor is there anything particularly novel about the tower that
supports a wind turbine, although the stresses put on a tower by a severalhundred-foot rotor may call for extra strengthening. Research is being undertaken to determine whether a "fail-safe" belt or cable system could be
used in the blades to prevent a thrown blade from traveling any significant
distance. And the machines being built today all feather their blades in high
winds and shut down completely when the wind reaches a certain level, so
that even uncharacteristically high winds should not pose a serious
216. See Lamm, supra note 140.
217. Nanda, Selected Legal and Institutional Issues Related to Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Development 7-17, SERI Rep. No. TR-62-204 (June, 1979).
218. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1976).
219. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
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To insure safety, city ordinances may regulate WECS by setback requirements, tower length limitations, and blade specifications. For injuries
caused by a utility-owned WECS, the liability may attach either upon a
theory of strict liability or a theory of negligence.
The general principle of the theory of strict liability is that "[o]ne who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land, or chattels or another resulting from the activity, although
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." 22 1 Strict liability will
be imposed upon an activity when there is the "existence of a high degree of
risk" and an "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care." 222 Therefore, it will be important for the utility using wind machines
to show that a high degree of risk or harm can be avoided by the exercise of
reasonable care. Also important in deciding whether a person is to be held
strictly liable for injuries that result from carrying on a particular activity is
the "extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage," and the
223
"inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on."
Large-scale electrical generation from an array of wind machines could be
found inappropriate in a densely populated area. A final factor in deciding
whether an activity is ultrahazardous is "the extent to which its value to the
224
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A utility using a WECS might also be found liable based on negligence.
The elements necessary to maintain a negligence cause of action include:
(1) a duty requiring the actor to protect others from unreasonable risks, (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) an injury which is proximately caused by the breach,
(4) actual loss or damage. 22 5 A utility must operate the WECS in such a
manner as not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm. The utility
owes this duty to any person who might foreseeably be injured by a breach
of the duty. If such a person is injured, the utility most likely will be liable.
It is important to realize that the law of negligence puts no burden on the
utility other than to act as a reasonably prudent person would in similar
226
circumstances.
A major concern of a utility owning a low-head hydro dam is potential
liability for injuries to persons and property resulting from a failure of the
dam. Courts are not uniform in the legal theories that they use to determine
liability for breach. This legal uncertainty can be a disincentive to develop220. F. ELDRIDGE, WIND MACHINES

30 (National Science

Found.,

1975); ENERGY

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, SOLAR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT:
MENTAL FACTORS, WIND ENERGY CONVERSION 28 (1977).

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
62-241
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See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977).
Id. §§ 520(a), 520(c).
Id. §§ 520(d), 520(e).
Id. § 520(0.
Ste W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
Coit, Wind Energy: Legal Issues and Institutional Barriers 14-15, SERI Rep. No. TR(June, 1979).
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ment of small hydroelectric projects, especially at older dams where safety
questions will be paramount. A majority of state courts require a showing of
negligent conduct on the part of the dam owner before finding liability for
injuries resulting from breach. 227 The dam owner is held to a standard of
reasonable care in constructing and operating the dam, including knowledge
of weather and water conditions that are likely to affect the dam. If a utility
does not exercise reasonable care and a dam breach results, the utility will be
liable for the injuries resulting from its negligence.
A minority of states employ a theory of strict liability for dam breach.
In the celebrated case ofR;/ands v. Fletcher,228 the English Court articulated
the doctrine that those who carry on unreasonably dangerous activities
should be responsible for all harm caused by those activities, even though the
harm does not result from negligent conduct. Recent cases have adopted the
strict liability theory from Rylands v. Fletcher when water stored behind a dam
229
on the defendant's property was released and flooded the plaintiff's land.
The second basis for a holding of strict liability for dam breach is state
statutory law. In some jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted which provide that dam owners shall be liable for all damages arising from overflow or
floods caused by dam breach. Courts have interpreted these statutes as requiring strict liability for all damages, irrespective of whether the dam owner
was negligent. 230 Utilities in these jurisdictions might not wish to develop
low-head hydro sites for fear of strict liability.
2.

Liability For Failure to Provide Electricity

A utility has a legal responsibility to supply electricity to all customers
in its area, regardless of the peak demands. If an electric supplier fails to
provide power to wholesale or retail customers, it will be liable for the resulting injuries to persons or property. 2 3 1 Utilities using low-head hydro,
WECS, solar thermal, or photovoltaic systems are thus subject to potential
liability because their capacity can vary according to stream flow, wind
speeds, and insolation levels. If an interruption in service is foreseeable (for
example, a prolonged drought, lack of wind, or extended cloudiness), a utility must give reasonable notice of the anticipated shutoff to protect customers from loss. The utility supplier is not liable, however, if an unforeseeable
2 32
act of God causes an interruption in service.
Utility users of renewable fuels should recognize the inherently intermittent nature of some renewable energy sources and provide for a limitaion
of liability. A utility may contractually limit its liability for power failure
227. See e.g., Eikland v. Casey, 290 F. 880 (9th Cir. 1923); Barr v. Game, Fish, and Parks
Comm'n, 30 Colo. App. 482, 497 P.2d 340 (1972).

228. L.R. 3, H.L. 330, 1 Erc. 256 (1868).
229. Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass. 1975); Smith v.
Board of County Road Comm'r, 5 Mich. App. 370, 146 N.W.2d 702 (1966).
230. Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz, 77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925); Beaver Water
and Irrigation Co. v. Emerson, 75 Colo. 513, 227 P. 547 (1924).
231. Se, e.g., National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App.
1973).
232. Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671 (1944).
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23 3
that is not the result of its own negligence.

CONCLUSION

As United States utilities face increasing demand for electricity, they
will have to expand conventional plant capacity and acquire the resources to
fuel this capacity. Gas utilities will, likewise, have to confront an increasing
demand for natural gas, as supplies become more expensive and difficult to
locate. Renewable resources and technologies can assist utilities in meeting
their consumer obligations. Decentralized technologies allow utilities to reduce customer demand for gas and electricity. Centralized renewable technologies allow utilities to supply gas and electricity from renewable fuels.
Although both kinds of applications are useful to utilities, their development
largely depends on laws, regulations, and cost factors. Therefore, the legal
and economic implications of utility use of renewable resources must not be
ignored.

233. See McGuigan, supra note 142, at 42.

